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CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO ENFORCE THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT;
THEREFORE FISA IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND THE
PRESIDENT'S TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM IS ILLEGAL
Wilson R. Huhn*
Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek
to transgress the separation of powers.'
-Justice Anthony Kennedy
ABSTRACT
The principal point of this Article is that Congress has plenary authority to enforce
the Bill of Rights against the federal government. Although this precept is a funda-
mental one, neither the Supreme Court nor legal scholars have articulated this point
in clear, simple, and direct terms. The Supreme Court does not have a monopoly on
the Bill of Rights. Congress, too, has constitutional authority to interpret our rights
and to enforce or enlarge them as against the actions of the federal government.
Congress exercised its power to protect the constitutional rights of American
citizens when it enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the federal
law that requires the government to obtain a warrant from a special court before en-
gaging in electronic eavesdropping for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence.
In spite of this law, the National Security Agency has conducted a program of warrant-
less surveillance called the Terrorist Surveillance Program.
The Attorney General made a nuanced and unique argument in support of the
Terrorist Surveillance Program. He suggested that wiretapping for foreign intelligence
is more central to the role of the President than it is to the role of Congress, and there-
fore FISA, the federal statute which requires the President to obtain warrants, is un-
constitutional. In response to that argument, this Article contends that Congress has
the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal government and that FISA
* C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law; J.D.,
Cornell Law School, 1977; B.A., Yale University, 1972. I wish to thank Dean Richard Aynes,
Associate Dean Elizabeth Reilly, and Professors Tracy Thomas, Jane Moriarty, William Rich,
and Brant Lee for their valuable suggestions, assistance, and support. This research was funded
in part with a summer fellowship from the University of Akron School of Law.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
infra notes 293-301 and accompanying text (setting forth Justice Kennedy's analysis of the
purpose of the doctrine of separation of powers).
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does represent an exercise by Congress of one of its core functions-to protect the
rights of American citizens.
The Attorney General also contended that FISA was amended by the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF), adopted September 18, 2001. This point has been
addressed by other legal scholars, and drawing upon their work, this Article identi-
fies six principal reasons why the AUMF cannot be construed as either repealing or
suspending the warrant requirements of FISA.
Finally, the Attorney General argued that FISA is unconstitutional under a broad
reading of executive power called the theory of the "unitary executive." This Article
contends that this theory was rejected by the four great Justices of the Roosevelt Court,
Hugo Black, William Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert Jackson, in the case of
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer. Justice Jackson, in particular, eloquently argued
that the President is subject to the rule of law. This Article also suggests that the
opinion of Anthony Kennedy in Clinton v. City of New York is relevant. In that case,
Justice Kennedy made "individual liberty" the centerpiece of the separation of powers
analysis. The Article concludes that both the rule of law and individual liberty are
served by upholding the constitutionality of FISA.
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INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States,
President George W. Bush ordered the National Security Agency (NSA) to undertake
a secret program--called the "Terrorist Surveillance Program"--of wiretapping the
international telephone calls and email messages of Americans without obtaining
warrants.2 This program continued for over four years,3 during which time it was in
apparent violation of a federal law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).4
The Attorney General, Alberto R. Gonzales, released a memorandum arguing that
the Terrorist Surveillance Program is lawful under FISA, and in the alternative, that
FISA is unconstitutional because it invades the inherent constitutional authority of
the President.5 A number of legal scholars have written responses concluding that
2 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754,764-65 (E.D. Mich. 2006),
rev'dfor lack of standing, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). The district court made the following
findings:
It is undisputed that Defendants have publicly admitted to the follow-
ing: (1) the TSP exists; (2) it operates without warrants; (3) it targets
communications where one party to the communication is outside the
United States, and the government has a reasonable basis to conclude
that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated
with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda,
or working in support of al Qaeda.
Id. at 764-65; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al (disclosing the existence of the wiretapping program); see
also Press Conference, President George W. Bush (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html. The President admitted to the exis-
tence of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, and stated, "I've reauthorized this program more
than 30 times since the September the 11 th attacks, and I intend to do so for so long as our
nation is [sic]-for so long as the nation faces the continuing threat of an enemy that wants
to kill American citizens." Id.
' See Editorial, "Never Mind" on Spying, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 19,2007, at 26. The editorial
states:
As a federal appeals court prepared to hear arguments on the legality of
the program, Atty. Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales told the Senate Judiciary
Committee that the administration has determined that it can obtain court
orders for surveillance with the "speed and agility" necessary to detect
terrorist conspiracies. "Accordingly," Gonzales deadpanned, "under
these circumstances, the president has determined not to reauthorize the
Terrorist Surveillance Program when the current [presidential] autho-
rization expires."
Id.
4 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1871 (West Supp. 2007); see infra Part III.
' Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities
Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19,
2006) in 81 IND. L.J. 1374 (2006) [hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum]; see infra Part HI.
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FISA is constitutional and that the Terrorist Surveillance Program is illegal,6 but
several of these scholars have assumed that Congress derives its authority to enact
FISA primarily from the Commerce Clause and its power to make laws regulating the
military.7 I argue that, in addition to these powers, Congress has the authority under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to enforce the Bill of Rights against the actions of
the federal government, and FISA is best understood as a measure that is designed to
ensure that the federal government is obedient to the Fourth Amendment.! This theory
strengthens the position that FISA is constitutional under the doctrine of separation
of powers.9
Part I of this Article seeks to establish the proposition that Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to enforce the Bill of Rights. 0 Part II shows that
FISA was adopted to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of Americans." Part III
describes the NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program and explains how it violates the
warrant provisions of FISA.' 2 Part IV lays out the President's arguments contending
6 See Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Robert B. Shaw, Down to the Wire: Assessing the
Constitutionality of the National SecurityAgency's Warrantless Wiretapping Program: Exit
the Rule of Law, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 429 (2006); Curtis Bradley et al., On NSA
Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs, Feb. 9,2006, at 42, reprinted in 81 IND.
L.J. 1364 (2006); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch,
106 CoLUM. L. REv. 1189 (2006); John Cary Sims, What NSA Is Doing ... And Why It's
Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105 (2006); Brian R. Decker, Comment, "The War of
Information ": The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and the
President's Warrantless-Wiretapping Program, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 291 (2006); Tara M.
Sugiyama & Marisa Perry, Note, The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis of
Congressional Oversight During an Era of One-Party Rule, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149
(2006); Katherine Wong, Recent Development, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program, 43
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517 (2006); Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea,
Cong. Research Serv., Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance
to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information (Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://www.eff.org/
Privacy/Surveillance/NSA/nsa researchmemo.pdf [hereinafter Bazan & Elsea].
' See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.");
id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 ("The Congress shall have power... To make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."); Bradley et al., supra note 6, at 1369 (referring
to Congress's power to regulate the military in another context, and stating, "Congress plainly
has authority to regulate domestic wiretapping by federal agencies under its Article I powers");
Sims, supra note 6, at 135 ("Congress unquestionably has broad powers that are applicable,
since it can regulate the interstate and foreign communications industry under the commerce
clause, and also regulate the military."); Wong, supra note 6, at 531 (stating that the Constitution
"authorizes Congress to raise, support, and make laws applying to the armed forces").
s See infra Part II.
9 See infra Part IV.
10 See infra Part I.
" See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part III.
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that FISA is unconstitutional because it violates the doctrine of separation of powers
and explains how the theory of congressional authority to enforce the Bill of Rights
supports the proposition that FISA is constitutional. 3
I. CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO ENFORCE THE BILL OF RIGHTS AGAINST THE
ACTIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
It is axiomatic that Congress has substantial authority to enforce the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment against the states.' 4 This power is grounded in section 5
'3 See infra Part IV.
See Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) (upholding the constitutionality of
a federal law protecting the rights of blacks to serve on juries). Speaking of section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Strong stated:
It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is autho-
rized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legis-
lation is contemplated to make the amendments fully effective. Whatever
legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of
perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against
State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain
of congressional power.
Nor does it make any difference that such legislation is restrictive of
what the State might have done before the constitutional amendment was
adopted. The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to
the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these
which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State
action, however put forth, whether that action be executive, legislative,
or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty. No
law can be, which the people of the States have, by the Constitution of
the United States, empowered Congress to enact.
Id.; see also City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (setting limits on the power
of Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment). Justice Kennedy stated:
Congress' power under § 5, however, extends only to "enforc[ing]"
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described
this power as "remedial[.]" The design of the Amendment and the text
of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power
to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on
the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not
enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been
given the power "to enforce," not the power to determine what constitutes
a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be en-
forcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the "provisions of
[the Fourteenth Amendment]."
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent uncon-
stitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states "Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."' 5
The central point of this Article is that Congress also has the power to enforce the
Bill of Rights against the federal government. This theory is amply supported by the
text of the Constitution and by longstanding American constitutional tradition. It is
the best explanation of the source of legislative power for many federal civil rights
laws, and for some of these laws, it is the only explanation that makes sense.
A. Textual, Judicial, and Historical Support for the Proposition that Congress
Has the Power to Enforce the Bill of Rights
The vesting clause of Article I differs from the vesting clauses of Article H and
Article III in one significant respect. While the President is vested with "the execu-
tive power ' in Article II and the federal courts are granted "the judicial power"17
in Article HI, Congress is vested with the "legislative powers herein granted"'18 in
Article I. Accordingly, when Congress acts, it must necessarily act pursuant to one
of its enumerated powers. Many of Congress's powers are contained in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, including the power to tax and spend; 9 the power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce;20 the power over the law of naturalization;2
the power over bankruptcy laws;22 the power to coin money;23 the power to establish
post offices; 4 the power to grant patents and copyrights; 25 the power to establish the
lower federal courts;26 the power to write law governing piracy, felonies on the high
seas, and crimes against the law of nations;" the power to write law for the District of
governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide
latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be
observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.
Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in
operation and effect.
Id. (citation omitted).
'5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
I6 d. art. II, § 1.
16 Id. art. III, § 1.
I Id. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
'9 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
20 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
21 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
22 Id.
23 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
24 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
26 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
27 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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Columbia;28 and a number of powers dealing with the military.29 Other powers are
scattered throughout the Constitution, such as the power to regulate federal elections;3°
the power to ratify treaties;3 the power to confirm the appointment of judges and ex-
ecutive branch officers;32 the power to impeach a President and other officers of the
United States; 33 the power to admit new states; 34 the power to regulate or dispose of
property owned by the United States;35 and the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution. 6 Several constitutional amendments, including the Sixteenth, Twentieth,
and the Twenty-fifth, grant additional powers to Congress,37 while a number of others,
including the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-
sixth, expressly provide that Congress has the power to enforce them.38
No provision of the Constitution expressly states that Congress has the power to
enforce the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights does not have an "Enforcement Clause"
parallel to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.39 However, the second portion
of the Necessary and Proper Clause does give Congress the authority to adopt laws
generally governing the conduct of the federal government.40 Congress's authority in
this regard is not limited to the exercise of its enumerated powers, but rather constitutes
plenary authority over any and all powers that are vested by the Constitution in the
national government. The Necessary and Proper Clause states: "The Congress shall
28 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
29 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-16.
30 Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
3, Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
32 Id.
" Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (granting the House "the sole Power of Impeachment"); id. art. I, § 3,
cl. 6 (granting the Senate "the sole Power to try all Impeachments"); id. art. II, § 4 (identifying
which officials are subject to impeachment and establishing grounds for impeachment).
34 Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
35 Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
36 Id. art. V.
37 Id. amend. XVI (granting Congress the power to impose an income tax); id. amend. XX,
§ 3 (authorizing Congress to establish the law of presidential succession); id. amend. XXV
(authorizing Congress to determine the persons who have the power to declare that the President
is unable to discharge his or her official duties).
38 Id. amend. XIII, § 2 (granting Congress the power to enforce the prohibition on slavery);
id. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress the power to protect fundamental rights against en-
croachment by the states); id. amend. XV, § 2 (granting Congress the power to prohibit racial
discrimination by any state or by the federal government affecting the right to vote); id. amend.
XIX (granting Congress the power to prohibit gender discrimination by any state or by the
federal government affecting the right to vote); id. amend. XXIII (granting Congress the power
to determine how the District of Columbia shall appoint members of the Electoral College);
id. amend. XXVI (granting Congress the power to prohibit discrimination by any state or by
the federal government affecting the right of persons over the age of eighteen to vote).
'9 See id. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
40 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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have power... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."'
One might argue that the italicized portion of the Necessary and Proper Clause
vests Congress with the discretion to legislate with respect to the powers that the
Constitution bestows upon the federal government, but that it does not grant Congress
the authority to legislate with respect to individual rights such as those contained
within the Bill of Rights. This would be an error, however. The Bill of Rights is,
above all, a set of limitations upon the power of the federal government. This was the
understanding of Chief Justice John Marshall, who was not only the leading architect
of the constitutional structure of the national government,4 2 but also a Framer by virtue
of his service at the Virginia ratifying convention.43 In Barron v. Baltimore, Marshall
described the Bill of Rights as a limitation on the "power" of the federal government.
4
He stated:
The people of the United States framed such a government for the
United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation, and
best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they con-
ferred on this government were to be exercised by itself, and the
limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally,
and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government created
by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the
instrument itself, not of distinct governments, framed by different
persons and for different purposes.
If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must
be understood as restraining the power of the general govern-
ment ....
Barron concerned the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to the action of a
state,' and it did not involve the constitutionality of any federal statute. However,
" Id. (emphasis added).
42 See BERNARD ScHwARTz, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME CouRT 32 (1993) (referring to
Marshall as "the great Chief Justice who, more than any one person, has left his imprint upon
the development of our constitutional law").
41 See Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John Marshall's
Judicial Statesmanship, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 391, 407 n.83 (2004) ("Addressing the
delegates at the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788, John Marshall noted the supremacy
of the Constitution over state and federal laws that conflicted with its provisions.").
32 U.S. 243 (1833) (ruling that the Bill of Rights is applicable against the federal
government and not the states).
45 Id. at 247.
See id. (noting that the petitioner had sued the state on the ground that it had violated
his right to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment).
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Marshall's characterization of the Fifth Amendment as a limitation on the "power"
of the federal government lends weight to the proposition that the Necessary and
Proper Clause, which confers upon Congress the authority to "make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution ... all other powers vested
by this Constitution in the government of the United States," should be understood
as conferring upon Congress the authority to ensure that the federal government-
including "any department or officer thereof'-is obedient to the limitations on
governmental power that are prescribed in the Bill of Rights.47
If one ignores the second portion of the Necessary and Proper Clause-with the
assumption that the Clause only vests Congress with the authority to enforce the "fore-
going" enumerated powers-then one might reasonably conclude that the Necessary
and Proper Clause does not authorize Congress to enforce the Bill of Rights. For
example, in 1866, Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, in reporting the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Senate, gave the Clause a narrow reading and ascribed a narrow
purpose to it, concluding that under that provision Congress did not have the power to
enforce the Bill of Rights, at least against the states.48 He proposed that the Fourteenth
Amendment would cure this defect in the Constitution, stating: "Here is a direct affir-
mative delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the principles of all these
guarantees, a power not found in the Constitution. 49
This was a matter of crucial concern to the members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress,
which served immediately after the Civil War, and to the members of the subsequent
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
48 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (remarks of Senator Howard).
Senator Howard stated:
Now, sir, there is no power given in the Constitution to enforce
and to carry out any of these guarantees [of the Bill of Rights]. They
are not powers granted by the Constitution to Congress, and of course
do not come within the sweeping clause of the Constitution authorizing
Congress to pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying out the fore-
going or granted powers, but they stand simply as a bill of rights in the
Constitution, without power on the part of Congress to give them full
effect; while at the same time the States are not restrained from violating
the principles embraced in them except by their own local constitutions,
which may be altered from year to year. The great object of the first
section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States
and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guar-
antees. How will it be done under the present amendment? As I have
remarked, they are not powers granted to Congress, and therefore it is
necessary, if they are to be effectuated and enforced, as they assuredly
ought to be, that additional power should be given to Congress to that end.
This is done by the fifth section of this amendment, which declares that
"the Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the
provisions of this article."
Id.
49 Id. at 2766.
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Reconstruction Congresses, who believed that it was incumbent upon Congress to
protect citizens in the exercise of their fundamental rights.5 In fact, the necessity that
Congress should have and exercise this power was a bedrock assumption that lay at the
core of their political philosophy, and it drove them to write the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments,5 as well as a host of civil rights laws.52 The Republican
Party of that time-the party led by Lincoln -was committed to the proposition that
while the citizen owes a duty of allegiance to the government, the government in return
owes a duty of protection to the citizen.53 "Allegiance and protection are reciprocal
rights,"' said Senator Lyman Trumbull, the floor manager for the Civil Rights Act
" See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION 302-05 (1990) (stating "[n]atural law and law-of-nations thinkers had stressed the
idea that citizens owe allegiance to their government in exchange for the government's grant
of protection to them," and citing members of Congress who agreed with this principle);
Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibility and the Right
Not to Be a Victim, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 63, 75-84 (1984) (discussing the linkage between alle-
giance and protection and tracing this idea to the philosophy of John Locke); Alan R. Madry,
State Action and the Due Process of Self-Help: Flagg Bros. Redux, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,40
(2000) (referring to the "familiar Republican linkage between allegiance and protection");
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham 's Theory
of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REv. 717,740 (2003) ("This theory of citizenship reflected the
'social compact' theory of John Locke, that people submit to the authority of the government
in return for its protection.").
51 See U.S. CONST. amend XIII (proposed by Congress in 1865, abolishing slavery); id.
amend. XIV (proposed by Congress in 1866, making all persons born or naturalized in the
United States citizens and prohibiting the states from interfering with fundamental rights); id.
amend. XV (proposed by Congress in 1869, guaranteeing the right to vote regardless of race).
52 See W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Questfor Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical, and
Related Considerations, 48 How. L.J. 1, 37 (2004) ("In the first decade after the Civil War,
Congress proposed and obtained passage of constitutional amendments and statutes providing
civil liberty and equality for blacks."); id. at 37-44 (describing civil rights laws adopted by the
Reconstruction Congress, including the creation of the Freedman's Bureau, the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, the Force Act of 1870, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1875).
53 See sources cited supra note 50.
54 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866). Senator Trumbull said:
How is it that every person born in these United States owes allegiance
to the Government? Everything that he is or has, his property and his life,
may be taken by the Government of the United States in its defense...
and can it be that.., we have got a Government which is all-powerful to
command the obedience of the citizen, but has no power to afford him
protection? Is that all that this boasted American citizenship amounts
to? ... Sir, it cannot be. Such is not the meaning of our Constitution.
Such is not the meaning of American citizenship. This Government,
which would go to war to protect its meanest... inhabitant... in any
foreign land whose rights were unjustly encroached upon, has certainly
some power to protect its own citizens in their own country.
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of 1866."s Congressman John Bingham, the principal author of the Fourteenth
Amendment,56 attributed this idea to Daniel Webster, 7 while Senator George Edmunds
traced it to the Magna Carta.58
These same Republicans were determined to exercise this power to protect the
newly-freed slaves from those who wished to oppress and return them to a state of
virtual slavery and second-class citizenship." In adopting the civil rights laws of the
Reconstruction period, the leaders of Congress pointed to the fact that before the Civil
War, Congress had enacted laws to protect the constitutional rights of slaveholders, and
the Supreme Court had upheld the exercise of this power in cases such as Ableman v.
Booth in which the Court upheld the Fugitive Slave Law "in all of its provisions."'
Constitutional historian Robert Kaczorowski observes that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment perceived that there was an intimate relation between the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.6' The Decla-
ration recognized fundamental rights which were incorporated into the Constitution,
and the Constitution "imposed a duty on Congress to enforce the fundamental rights
they recognized and secured as rights of United States citizens."62 This view of the
" See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 103
(1990).
56 See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment,
103 YALE L.J. 57, 58 (1993).
17 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1871). Bingham quoted Daniel Webster
as having said:
The maintenance of this Constitution does not depend on the plighted
faith of the States as States to support it.... It relies on individual duty
and obligation.... On the other hand, the Government owes high and
solemn duties to every citizen of the country. It is bound to protect him
in his most important rights and interests.
Id.
5 See id. at 697 (remarks of Senator Edmunds).
'9 See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
60 62 U.S. 506,526 (1858); RobertJ. Kaczorowski, Congress's Powerto Enforce Fourteenth
Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON
LEGiS. 187,200 (2005) ("The Republican leaders and supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
insisted that Congress possessed as much constitutional authority to protect and enforce human
rights and equality as it had exercised to protect and enforce the property right in slaves.").
61 Kaczorowski, supra note 60, at 203.
62 Id. Professor Kaczorowski states:
The framers' theory of plenary constitutional delegation was also
premised on their assumption that equality and the natural rights of life,
liberty, and property and rights incident thereto proclaimed in the
Declaration of Independence constituted the fundamental rights of all
Americans. The framers and supporters insisted that the Constitution
recognizes and secures these rights in various provisions, primarily the
Thirteenth Amendment, but also in others such as the Privileges and
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Reconstruction Congress is consistent with Lincoln's political philosophy, which
placed the eternal truths of the Declaration of Independence at the core of American
law. Over and over again, Lincoln emphasized that our understanding of the Consti-
tution at any particular point in time is but an imperfect realization of the principles
of the Declaration, 3 which for Lincoln expressed an ideal that is to be "constantly
looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly
approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and aug-
menting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere."' In
short, government exists-our nation exists-so that freedom can be preserved and
protected.65 In light of this principle, in the words of Senator Lyman Trumbull, it
"cannot be" that Congress lacks the authority to adopt legislation protecting citizens
in their fundamental rights.66
In the modern era, in the case of Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Supreme Court
embraced the proposition that Congress has the power to protect our fundamental
rights.67 In that case, a group of African American residents of Tennessee were hauled
from their car by a group of whites in the state of Mississippi and threatened and beaten
Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Bill of Rights, and the Fifth Amend-
ment's explicit guarantee of life, liberty, and property. They applied to
these constitutional provisions the McCulloch and Prigg theories of broad
constitutional delegation of implied congressional power and insisted
that these provisions delegated to Congress plenary power to enforce
and protect the fundamental rights of all Americans, and that they autho-
rized Congress to enact civil and criminal remedies and a federal en-
forcement structure to ensure that all Americans are secure in their civil
rights. The framers also argued that the principles of the Declaration of
Independence, and the social contract that these principles betokened,
were incorporated into the Constitution through these provisions and that
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution imposed a duty on
Congress to enforce the fundamental rights they recognized and secured
as rights of United States citizens.
Id.
63 See Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the Constitution and the Union (Jan. 1861), in 4
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 168,169 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (characterizing
the words of the Declaration of Independence promising "liberty to all" as "the apple of gold"
and the Constitution as "the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it").
' Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Ill. (June 26, 1857), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 398, 406 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
65 See Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 17, 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (referring to the United States as
"conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," and
stating that the Civil War had been fought so "that government of the people, by the people,
for the people, shall not perish from the earth").
66 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866).
67 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (reversing the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
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because the whites mistakenly believed the blacks to be civil rights workers. 68 The
plaintiffs sued the defendants for damages under42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a Reconstruction
era civil rights law which imposes liability upon combinations of two or more persons
who interfere with any person "exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States."69 The lower courts had dismissed the complaint because the defen-
dants were private individuals and the assault was not "state action," but the Supreme
Court reinstated the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that "state action" was not a re-
quired element of this particular claim under section 1985(3).7o In the course of its
opinion, the Court declared that Congress has broad powers to defend constitutional
rights against invasion. The Court stated:
Our cases have firmly established that the right of interstate
travel is constitutionally protected, does not necessarily rest on the
Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against private as well
as governmental interference. The "right to pass freely from State
to State" has been explicitly recognized as "among the rights and
privileges of National citizenship." That right, like other rights of
national citizenship, is within the power of Congress to protect by
appropriate legislation.7"
Griffin does not, on its facts, stand for the proposition that Congress has the power
to enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal government. However, the above-
quoted language from Griffin establishes unequivocally that Congress does have this
power. The Bill of Rights undoubtedly comprises "rights of national citizenship"
68 See id. at 90-91.
69 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000). The statute provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriv-
ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws... [and] in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if
one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured
in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or de-
prived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by
such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Id.
70 See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 92, 101 ("It is thus evident that all indicators-text, companion
provisions, and legislative history-point unwaveringly to § 1985(3)'s coverage of private
conspiracies.").
"' Id. at 105-06 (citations omitted).
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which are effective against the national government. In Griffin, the Court stated that
Congress has the power to protect these rights "by appropriate legislation.
7 2
Congress has exercised its power to protect against infringements of constitu-
tional rights by the federal government in many contexts. A number of these laws are
discussed in the following portion of this Article.
B. Examples of Federal Laws Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the
Federal Government
Congress has adopted a number of laws that require departments and officers
of the federal government to obey the Bill of Rights. Some of these statutes protect
our civil rights in general terms against invasion by any persons or by persons acting
"under color of law."73 Other laws establish general standards of procedural fairness
or equal protection that must be observed by agencies of the federal government.74 Yet
other statutes protect rights created by specific provisions of the Bill of Rights against
infringement by the federal government.75 All of these laws are practical evidence of
the fact that Congress has the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal
government.
1. Laws Protecting Civil Rights Generally Against Federal Infringement
During the Reconstruction era, Congress made it a crime for any person acting
"under color of any law" to infringe upon another person's constitutional rights. 6
72 Id. at 106.
71 See infra Part I.B. 1.
74 See infra Part I.B.2.
71 See infra Part I.B.3.
76 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000); see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1945)
(describing the drafting and origin of this law during the Reconstruction period). The law states:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or cus-
tom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Common-
wealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account
of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than
are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury
results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts
include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon,
explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in
violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt
to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated
sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or
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This law, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 242, has been construed to apply to all governmental
officials, whether federal or state. Interpreting this law in Screws v. United States,7
7
Justice William 0. Douglas stated: "He who acts under 'color' of law may be a federal
officer or a state officer. He may act under 'color' of federal law or of state law."' In
1980, in United States v. Otherson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit cited this language from Screws and upheld the convictions of two United
States Border Patrol agents under section 242 for assaulting aliens who had illegally
entered the United States.79
The obvious purpose of section 242 is to prevent government officials from
violating people's constitutional rights. In Screws, Justice Douglas quoted Senator
Lyman Trumbull, chair of the Judiciary Committee which reported the original civil
rights bill from which section 242 was derived, as stating that the purpose of the bill
was "to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights."80
There is no civil counterpart to section 242. The civil rights statute codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a civil remedy for violations of constitutional rights per-
formed by any person under color of state law.8' The Supreme Court has ruled that
section 1983 does not apply to the actions of officers of the federal government.8
imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced
to death.
18 U.S.C. § 242.
17 325 U.S. at 107 (reversing the defendant's conviction under section 242 on the ground
that the trial court should have instructed the jury that "[t]o convict it was necessary for them
to find that petitioners had the purpose to deprive the prisoner of a constitutional right"); see
also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (ruling that defendants may be found guilty
under section 242 only where the unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct is apparent in light
of pre-existing law).
78 Screws, 325 U.S. at 108.
"' United States v. Otherson, 637 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
840 (1981); see id. at 1279 ("Appellants have thus advanced no persuasive reason for confining
the application of section 242 to actions under color of state law, and we decline their invitation
to do so.").
8o Screws, 325 U.S. at 98 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866)).
81 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), which provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declara-
tory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
82 See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1973). The Court stated:
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There is no federal statute corresponding to section 1983 that imposes civil liability
directly upon federal officers. In the absence of such a federal statute, the Supreme
Court ruled in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics that the Constitution of the United States, by creating rights that are enforce-
able against the federal government, also implies the existence of remedies for those
rights. Accordingly persons who are aggrieved by the federal government in the
exercise of their constitutional rights may maintain an action against the government
to redress those grievances. 84 The Court implied in Bivens, however, that Congress
would have the authority to enact a statute recognizing and regulating constitutional
claims against federal officers, 85 and because of the inadequacies of the Bivens reme-
dies,86 many persons have called for the adoption of such a law. 87 Furthermore,
Like the Amendment upon which it [is] based, § 1983 is of only limited
scope. The statute deals only with those deprivations of rights that are
accomplished under the color of the law of "any State or Territory." It
does not reach purely private conduct and, with the exception of the
Territories, actions of the Federal Government and its officers are at
least facially exempt from its proscriptions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
83 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (ruling that petitioner had an implied cause of action under the
Fourth Amendment against federal officers who allegedly conducted an illegal search and arrest
without warrant or probable cause).
8 See id. at 396. Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its
enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of its
violation. But "it is... well settled that where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done." The present case involves no special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirnative action by Congress.
Id. (citation omitted).
85 See id. (implying that a federal statute could have "provid[ed] for a general right to sue
for such invasion"); id. at 397 ("[W]e have here no explicit congressional declaration that
persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover
money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally
effective in the view of Congress.").
86 See, e.g., Ryan D. Newman, Note, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: Implied
Constitutional Remedies and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEx. L. REv. 471, 472 (2006)
(describing limitations on Bivens actions and stating, "[a]lthough the Court has declined to
expressly overturn Bivens, its steadfast refusal over more than two decades to extend the
doctrine into new contexts has reduced the cause of action to a mere shadow of its former
self'); id. at 475 ("Bivens is indeed an unfulfilled promise.").
87 See, e.g., Michael B. Hedrick, Note, New Life for a Good Idea: Revitalizing Efforts to
Replace the Bivens Action with a Statutory Waiver of the Sovereign Immunity of the United
States for Constitutional Tort Suits, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1055, 1055 (2003) ("Numerous
bipartisan efforts to replace the Bivens action with a statutory cause of action have failed....").
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although Congress has not explicitly enacted legislation authorizing civil suits against
federal officers based generally upon constitutional claims, it has conferred jurisdiction
upon the federal courts to hear claims against the federal government based upon
constitutional violations.8"
2. Laws Protecting Specific Constitutional Rights Against Federal Infringement
A number of federal laws prohibit agencies or officers of the federal government
from infringing upon particular constitutional rights.
In his State of the Union Address of January 14, 1963, President John F. Kennedy
stated: "The right to competent counsel must be assured to every man accused of crime
in Federal court regardless of his means." 89 President Kennedy and Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy submitted proposed legislation to Congress that would guarantee
the right to counsel. a° In response, Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,
which provided for the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in federal
court. 9' Congress amended the law in 1970,92 partly in order to conform the Act to
recent Supreme Court decisions that had extended the right to counsel93 and partly
to grant new rights to counsel consistent with Congress's understanding of the require-
ments of the Bill of Rights.' The 1970 amendments to the Act extended the right to
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2000) (granting the district courts jurisdiction, concurrent
with the Court of Claims, over a "civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress").
" Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1963 Pub. Papers 11 14
(Jan. 14, 1963).
90 See H.R. REP. No. 88-864 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2990, 2991.
9' Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000))
("Each United States district court, with the approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall
place in operation throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for any person
financially unable to obtain adequate representation ....").
92 Pub. L. No. 91-447, 84 Stat. 916 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(2000)).
9' See H.R. REP. 91-1546 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3982,3987 (stating that
the amendment "will bring the act into conformity with recent decisions of the Supreme Court
which require counsel for arrested persons").
94 See id. at 3987-88. The Committee stated:
Section 1 (a)(3) requires that each plan provide for the appointment
of counsel, pursuant to the provisions of section l(g), for individuals
financially unable to secure adequate representation who are subject to
revocation of parole, who are material witnesses in custody, or who are
seeking collateral relief. Inasmuch as these proceedings have traditionally
been regarded as technically civil in nature rather than criminal, no right
to appointed counsel has as yet been recognized under the sixth amend-
ment. The distinction between civil and criminal matters, however, has
become increasingly obscure where deprivation of personal liberty is
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counsel to persons facing revocation of parole, even though the Supreme Court at
that time had not found that the Constitution required this.95 Although the Criminal
Justice Act may be accurately characterized as an exercise of Congress's power under
the Spending Clause, it finds additional support as an expression of Congress's deter-
mination to enforce and protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 96
In 1975 Congress enacted another statute protecting a right that is guaranteed
under the Sixth Amendment: the right to a speedy trial.97 Unlike the Criminal Justice
Act, the Speedy Trial Act9 is not a spending measure, but as in the case of the Criminal
Justice Act, Congress stated that it was acting for the purpose of preserving the rights
of criminal defendants under the Sixth Amendment." Moreover, as with the Criminal
involved. The proceedings listed in subsection 1 (a)(3) and 1 (g) are inti-
mately related to the criminal process. Counsel has often been appointed
to represent persons in such proceedings, but compensation has not been
available under the 1964 act. The committee believes that compensation
should be available under the act whenever a judge determines that
counsel must be appointed to safeguard the interests of justice.
Id. (citing to In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1(1967) and Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)).
9' See id.; see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that counsel must
be provided in probation revocation hearings in appropriate cases); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471,489 (1972) (not reaching the question of whether counsel must be provided in parole
revocation hearings).
96 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
9 See id. ("[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ...
98 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2000).
99 See H.R. REP. No. 93-1508 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7404-05.
The House Judiciary Committee made the following findings in support of this bill:
The Committee finds that the adoption of speedy trial legislation is
necessary in order to give real meaning to that Sixth Amendment right.
Thus far, neither the decisions of the Supreme Court nor the implemen-
tation of Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, concern-
ing plans for achieving the prompt disposition of criminal cases, provides
the courts with adequate guidance on this question.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to a speedy trial is relative
and depends upon a number of factors. A delay of one year in some
instances has been interpreted as prima facie evidence of a denial of the
right. However, in others, a delay of up to eighteen years has been held
not to violate the Sixth Amendment. In its 1972 decision, Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, the Court stressed four factors in determining
whether the right to a speedy trial had been denied to a defendant: length
of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right,
and prejudice to the defendant. The task of balancing these factors and
arriving at a conclusion which is fair in all cases is a difficult task. It pro-
vides no guidance to either the defendant or the criminal justice system.
It is, in effect, a neutral test which reinforces the legitimacy of delay.
With respect to providing specified time periods in which a defendant
must be brought to trial, the Court in Barker admitted that such a ruling
[Vol. 16:537
CONGRESS HAS POWER TO ENFORCE BILL OF RIGHTS
Justice Act, in the Speedy Trial Act Congress consciously extended statutory pro-
tection beyond constitutional norms by setting specific time limits within which the
government must bring a defendant to trial, a task that the Supreme Court had failed
to undertake. I"
Another federal civil rights law prohibits "an officer or other person charged with
any duty in the selection or summoning ofjurors" from excluding or failing to summon
any citizen for jury duty on account of their race.'' This law protects both the right
of citizens to serve on juries without regard to race and the right of litigants and crim-
inal defendants to a fair trial. These rights are both grounded in the Bill of Rights. The
right to ajury is contained in the Sixth and the Seventh Amendments,' 2 while the right
to be free from invidious racial discrimination at the hands of the federal government
is now understood to arise from the "equal protection component" of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 03
Another federal law that is based in part upon Congress's power to enforce the
Bill of Rights is the foundation statute governing administrative process--the federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' °4 When the House Judiciary Committee re-
ported the APA to the floor of Congress in 1946, it characterized the law as "an outline
would have the virtue of clarifying when the right is infringed and of
simplifying the courts' application of it. However, the Court said: "But
such a result would require this Court to engage in legislative or rule-
making activity, rather than in the adjudicative process to which we
should confine our efforts." Id. at 523.
Id.
'0o See id.
0 See 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2000), which states:
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be pre-
scribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in
any court of the United States, or of any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude; and whoever, being an officer or other
person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors,
excludes or fails to summon any citizen for such cause, shall be fined not
more than $5,000.
102 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .. "); id. amend. VII ("In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved....").
103 See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Justice Warren stated:
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government. We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the
District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
Id. (footnote omitted).
'04 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000).
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of minimum essential rights and procedures" that must be observed by agencies of
the federal government. 10 5 Section 554 provides that administrative agencies must
give persons timely notice of "the time, place, and nature of the hearing; the legal
authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; and the matters of
fact and law asserted."' 6 Section 556 prescribes that "[a] party is entitled to present
his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and
to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of
the facts."'0 7 These are elementary requirements of due process. 10 8
Another federal law, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,'"exemplifies the
power of Congress to enforce the First Amendment against the federal government.
This law, and the constitutional litigation surrounding it, is the subject of the following
portion of this Article.
3. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was enacted in 1993 in reaction
to the decision of the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith, which limited
the scope of religious freedom under the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 In essence, RFRA
represented an attempt to legislatively overturn the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Smith and to expand the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause as applied to the states."'
In this respect, the law was a failure-the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked
the authority to enact this measure as applied to state governments." 2 Congress then
amended the law to clarify that it is binding only upon departments and officers of
105 See H.R. REP. No. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1195, 1205.
'06 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2000).
107 Id. § 556(d).
108 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (setting forth fundamental prin-
ciples of procedural due process in proceedings before an administrative agency). Justice
Brennan stated:
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be
heard." The hearing must be "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner." In the present context these principles require that a recipient
have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed
termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any
adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence
orally.
Id. (citations omitted).
109 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-bb-4 (2000).
110 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding denial of unemployment compensation benefits to
persons who were fired for ingesting peyote in accordance with ceremony of their Native
American Church).
"' See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
"2 See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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the federal government." 3 In 2006, in the case of Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, the Supreme Court, without identifying the basis of
Congress's power to enact the law, upheld RFRA as applied to an agency of the federal
government. 4 The only conclusion that may be drawn from this result is that Congress
has the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal government, and that
Congress's power in this regard is greater than its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment against the states. This back-and-forth battle between Congress and the
Supreme Court over religious liberty is described in more detail below.
Prior to 1990, the Supreme Court had ruled that laws that impose a substantial
burden on a person's right to the free exercise of religion were presumptively invalid
and would be upheld as constitutional only if they could be justified under a heightened
standard of review." 5 In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court
modified the doctrine that had been established in those previous cases and held that
"generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular
religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest." 1 6 In
evaluating the constitutionality of generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise
Clause, the Supreme Court replaced the strict scrutiny test with the much looser rational
basis standard." 7
Congress struck back in 1993 by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act," 8 which reinstated the strict scrutiny test whenever any governmental entity,
state or federal, takes action that substantially burdens the free exercise of religion. " 9
"3 See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
"4 546 U.S. 418 (2006); see infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
"' See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down compulsory attendance law
as applied to Amish children who have graduated from the eighth grade); id. at 215 ("[O]nly
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (striking
down the decision of a state agency denying unemployment compensation to a person who
refused to work on Saturdays for religious reasons); id. at 406 ("It is basic that no showing
merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly
sensitive constitutional area, '[olnly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation."').
116 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990); see id. at 882-89 (rejecting the "compelling state interest"
test in evaluating the constitutionality of laws of general applicability that impose substantial
burdens on free exercise of religion).
"' See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins ofYoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory
of FirstAmendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV.
9, 20 (2001) ("Considering Smith and Babalu Aye together, the Court's position in Free
Exercise Clause cases is clear. The level ofjudicial scrutiny-strict scrutiny or rational basis-
is determined by whether or not the challenged law is a neutral law of general applicability.").
1' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-bb-4 (2000), partially invalidated by City of Boeme v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, which provides:
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
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The text of the Act states that the purpose of the law is to protect the First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion. The statute provides:
The purposes of this Chapter are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government.1
20
The Senate Judiciary Committee suggested that the source of Congress's power
to enact RFRA was section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it also indicated that
the real source of authority was Congress's power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment.' 2' The Committee stated:
[C]ongressional power under section 5 to enforce the 14th amend-
ment includes congressional power to enforce the free exercise
clause. Because the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is clearly
designed to implement the free exercise clause-to protect
religious liberty and to eliminate laws "prohibiting the free
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person-( 1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest.
(c) Judicial relief. A person whose religious exercise has been bur-
dened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim
or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against
a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section
shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of
the Constitution.
120 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b); see also S. REP. No. 103-111, at 2 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893. The Committee stated that RFRA:
[RIesponds to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith by creating a
statutory prohibition against government action substantially burdening
the exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the Government demonstrates that the action is the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.
Id. (footnote omitted).
121 Id. at 14, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1903.
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exercise" of religion-it falls squarely within Congress' section
5 enforcement power.1
22
The House Judiciary Committee not only cited section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an authority through which Congress could enact RFRA, but it also
cited the Necessary and Proper Clause as granting Congress the power "to provide
statutory protection for a constitutional value."'23
Four years later in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court ruled that Congress's
attempt to legislatively overrule its decision in Smith was invalid, at least as applied
to the actions of a municipality. 24 The Court held that Congress lacked authority
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to impose the strict scrutiny standard
for religious liberty upon the states, because this remedy was not congruent with and
proportionate to any violations of the people's right to free exercise of religion, as
applicable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
25
Accordingly, City of Boerne stands for the proposition that RFRA is unconstitu-
tional as applied to the states. But in the year 2000, Congress amended RFRA to
make it clear that the statute applied only to the federal government.' 26 The question
remained whether RFRA was constitutional as applied to the federal government.127
122 Id. (footnote omitted).
123 See H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993). The Committee Report states:
Finally, the Committee believes that Congress has the constitutional
authority to enact [RFRA]. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause embodied in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, the legislative branch has been given the
authority to provide statutory protection for a constitutional value ....
Id.
124 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("Broad as the power of Congress
is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital prin-
ciples necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.").
125 See id. at 520 ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.").
126 See Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 7(a), 114 Stat. 806 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
2000bb-2 (2000)). The law now provides:
As used in this chapter-
(1) the term "government" includes a branch, department, agency,
instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law)
of the United States, or of a covered entity;
(2) the term "covered entity" means the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each territory and possession of
the United States ....
Id.
127 See Robert A. Destro, "By What Right?": The Sources and Limits of Federal Court
and Congressional Jurisdiction over Matters "Touching Religion," 29 IND. L. REv. 1, 91
(1995) (arguing that Congress has the authority to enact RFRA with respect to actions of the
federal government, and stating that "[a]s long as congressional action does not amount to
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The great majority of the lower federal courts that considered the question
eventually came to the conclusion that RFRA was constitutional as applied to the
federal government. 28
In upholding the application of RFRA against the federal government, the lower
federal courts necessarily held that RFRA expands the right to free exercise of religion
beyond what the Supreme Court has ruled necessary under its interpretation of the
First Amendment in Smith. For example, in 1998, in the case of In re Young, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Congress does have the power to extend
protection for constitutional rights beyond the constitutional minimum prescribed
by the Supreme Court. 2 9 The Eighth Circuit observed that "Congress has often pro-
vided statutory protection of individual liberties that exceed the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of constitutional protection."'' 30 A number of other lower federal courts have
agreed with this ruling.'
13
There are two principal ways of describing why Congress has the power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to make RFRA applicable against the federal govern-
ment.132 First, RFRA may be considered to be a law that amends other federal laws,
a law 'respecting an establishment of religion,' it is for Congress to define how solicitous of
religious freedom the executive branch shall be as it goes about the task of seeing that the
laws 'be faithfully executed"').
128 See, e.g., Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding RFRA as a defense
to a private cause of action brought under a federal statute); O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349
F.3d 399,400-01 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding RFRA against the federal government); Guam
v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958
(10th Cir. 2001) (same, but noting that defendants had cited "an unpublished Tenth Circuit case
and a handful of federal district court cases in which Flores was interpreted to render RFRA
unconstitutional not only in its application to the states but also in its application to the federal
government"); Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d. 1072, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding
RFRA against the federal government); In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 811 (1998) (same).
29 Young, 141 F.3d at 855.
30 Id. at 860. The circuit court cited the following examples of federal laws that expanded
protection for constitutional rights:
See, e.g., Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to
2000aa- 12 (reacting to Zurcherv. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978),
and providing journalists with greater protection against searches and
seizures); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989, § 508, 10 U.S.C. § 774 (reacting to Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986), and providing that members of military were entitled
to wear religious headgear); cf. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (reacting to Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and
equating employment discrimination based on pregnancy with employ-
ment discrimination based on gender).
Id.
131 See Hankins, 441 F.3d at 107 (quoting and following language from In re Young);
Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1220 n.16 (same); Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 959.
132 See Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 368-69 n.17 (D.N.J. 2004) (discussing various
(Vol. 16:537
CONGRESS HAS POWER TO ENFORCE BILL OF RIGHTS
and as such, when Congress adopted RFRA, it was exercising the same power that it
exercised when it enacted the original law.'33 It could be argued, for example, that
RFRA is constitutional as applied to a federal agency regulating business solely be-
cause the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to create the agency in the
first place or that RFRA may properly govern the actions of a federal agency that dis-
burses benefits because Congress has the power to create benefits programs under the
Spending Clause. Under this theory, Congress's authority to enact RFRA derives from
its authority to enact the underlying law that is affected by RFRA.
The second line of reasoning that could be used to support the constitutionality
of "federal RFRA" rests upon the precept that is the principal point of this Article,
that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to enforce the Bill
of Rights, and that RFRA is a straightforward exercise of this power.'
34
In Hankins v. Lyght, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals cited both reasons in
support of its ruling that RFRA modified the requirements of the federal Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA).'35 The court stated:
It is obvious to us that because Congress had the power to enact
the ADEA, it also had the power to amend that statute by pass-
ing the RFRA. The RFRA was authorized by the Necessary and
Proper Clause because its purpose-to protect First Amendment
rights as interpreted by the Congress-was permissible. 13 6
One reason to reject the notion that RFRA is premised solely upon Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause or the Spending Clause is that this would conflate
the RFRA with the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), '37
which Congress enacted in the year 2000 in another attempt to overrule the result in
City of Boerne.1 31 Unlike RFRA, the RLUIPA is an explicit exercise of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause,3 3 and by the terms of
theories of congressional authority for enacting RFRA).
' See, e.g., Young, 141 F.3d at 861 ("We conclude that RFRA is an appropriate means
by Congress to modify the United States bankruptcy laws.").
'34 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
131 441 F.3d 96 (2006) (upholding RFRA as defense to a cause of action under the ADEA).
136 Id. at 106 (citing S. REP. No. 103-111, at 14 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1892, 1903).
13' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-cc-5 (2000).
131 See id. § 2000cc(a) (requiring land use regulations that substantially effect free exercise
rights to pass the strict scrutiny test); id. § 2000cc-l(a) (requiring any government action that
affects the free exercise rights of institutionalized persons to pass the strict scrutiny test).
139 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) (stating that RFRA "notably lacked
a Commerce Clause underpinning or a Spending Clause limitation to recipients of federal
funds," but that in enacting RLUIPA Congress was "invoking federal authority under the
Spending and Commerce Clauses").
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that statute, it applies only to those entities and activities which are regulable under
those constitutional provisions."' In contrast, RFRA, as presently written, is applicable
against the federal government only, and it constitutes an exercise of Congress's power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause."' In the 2005 case of Cutter v. Wilkinson,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the RLUIPA against an Establish-
ment Clause challenge, 42 but it expressly noted that the Court had not yet ruled upon
the constitutionality of RFRA as amended.1
43
Would the Supreme Court uphold RFRA against the federal government, and if
so, upon what grounds would it base congressional power to enact the law? One year
after Cutter, and nine years after its decision in City of Boerne where it had declared
RFRA unconstitutional as against the states,' 4 in the case of Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, the Supreme Court held that Congress does
have the authority to make RFRA applicable against the actions of the federal govern-
ment. 145 However, the Court did not identify the precise source of Congress's power
to enact this law.
In the 0 Centro case, a small religious sect with roots in the Amazon rainforest
brought suit to enjoin the United States Attorney General from enforcing the Controlled
Substances Act' 46 against the sect's use of hoasca, a hallucinogenic tea that members
drank as a sacrament. 47 The sect asserted that prosecution under the federal drug laws
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2), which provides:
This subsection applies in any case in which-(A) the substantial bur-
den is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial
assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability;
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States,
or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability; or (C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implemen-
tation of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under
which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures
or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assess-
ments of the proposed uses for the property involved.
Id. See also section 2000cc- I (b), which provides: "This section applies in any case in which-
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial
assistance; or (2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would
affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes."
' See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
142 544 U.S. at 725 (upholding RLUIPA against a facial challenge under the Establishment
Clause against federal prison officials).
14' See id. at 715 n.2 ("RFRA, Courts of Appeals have held, remains operative as to the
Federal Government and federal territories and possessions. This Court, however, has not
had occasion to rule on the matter." (citations omitted)).
'44 City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
"' 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
'46 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
147 See 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 423.
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could not lawfully be applied to ban the ingestion of hoasca because the federal
government did not have a "compelling governmental interest" that would outweigh
the sect's right to free exercise of religion, as required by RFRA. 48
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the 0 Centro church, finding that the government of the United States
had failed to prove that there was a compelling reason to prosecute the sacramental
use of hoasca.' 49 Although the Chief Justice observed in a footnote that the Court had
decided in Smith that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states, he did not
explain why this law was constitutional as applied to the federal government. 5 ° How-
ever, at the close of his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that,
in this context, the Court would defer to the will of Congress, as expressed in RFRA,
regarding the importance of religious exercise.' The Court stated:
The Government repeatedly invokes Congress' findings and
purposes underlying the Controlled Substances Act, but Congress
had a reason for enacting RFRA, too. Congress recognized that
"laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise
as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise,"
and legislated "the compelling interest test" as the means for the
courts to "strik[e] sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests."
We have no cause to pretend that the task assigned by
Congress to the courts under RFRA is an easy one. Indeed, the
very sort of difficulties highlighted by the Government here were
cited by this Court in deciding that the approach later mandated
by Congress under RFRA was not required as a matter of constitu-
tional law under the Free Exercise Clause. But Congress has deter-
mined that courts should strike sensible balances, pursuant to a
compelling interest test that requires the Government to address the
particular practice at issue. Applying that test, we conclude that
the courts below did not err in determining that the Government
failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a com-
pelling interest in barring the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca.1
52
148 See id.
149 See id. at 438-39 (finding no compelling governmental interest to criminalize the sacra-
mental use of hoasca in the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act or the enforcement
of the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances).
50 See id. at 424 n. 1 ("As originally enacted, RFRA applied to States as well as the Federal
Government. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), we held the application to
States to be beyond Congress' legislative authority under § 5 of the 14th Amendment.").
'5' Id. at 439.
152 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2), (5) and citing Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 885-90 (1990)).
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What is striking about the foregoing passage from 0 Centro is that the Supreme
Court implicitly acknowledged that Congress, in the name of protecting religious
liberty, has the authority to prohibit the federal government from enforcing a law
that the Court itself would not have found to be in violation of the First Amendment.
In other words, Congress has the power to expand our protections under the Bill of
Rights, at least as against invasion by the federal government. This is contrary to the
Court's ruling in Smith, where it held that Congress could not legislatively adopt a
strict scrutiny test in order to insulate Americans from state laws affecting funda-
mental freedoms.153
In summary, an examination of the foregoing authorities leads to the following
conclusions. First, the Necessary and Proper Clause vests Congress with plenary
authority to enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal government. Second,
Congress's authority to enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal government is
broader than its power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the States in that Congress
has discretion to expand the scope of our freedoms beyond those which the Court has
recognized in prohibiting the federal government from infringing upon our funda-
mental rights.
With those principles in mind, the following portion of this Article contends that
Congress enacted FISA for the purpose of protecting our freedom under the Fourth
Amendment.
II. FISA WAS ADOPTED TO PROTECT FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Legal scholars have suggested that Congress derives its authority to enact FISA
from the Commerce Clause or from its power to regulate the military.'54 While I agree
that these specific provisions of Article I, Section 8, afford a sufficient basis for the
enactment of FISA, I propose that Congress also had authority to enact this law because
Congress has the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal government.
In 1968, the nation faced two problems involving electronic eavesdropping. First,
although the Supreme Court had already ruled in Berger v. New York 55 and Katz v.
United States156 that electronic eavesdropping by state and federal officers was sub-
ject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 157 there existed no uniform statutory
15' See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
154 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
15' 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (striking down state's procedures for obtaining warrant for wiretap
for being inadequate under the Fourth Amendment).
156 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding Fourth Amendment violation in warrantless wiretap on
public telephone).
117 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
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procedure for the government to obtain warrants to conduct surveillance.' 5 8 Second,
eavesdropping by private parties, including industrial espionage, was becoming a wide-
spread problem.I5 9 Congress responded by enacting the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. " Title I of the Omnibus Act established procedures that
the government must follow in order to obtain warrants for wiretapping phones and
intercepting oral communications, 6 ' and it outlawed all interception conducted without
either consent or pursuant to a warrant lawfully obtained. 62 In provisions which are
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 and 2520, Congress imposed criminal and civil penalties
on persons who unlawfully intercept wire or oral communications. ' 63
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report for the Omnibus Bill discussed the
primary Supreme Court precedent in detail' 64 and concluded that "[t]his proposed
legislation conforms to the constitutional standards set out in Berger v. New York
and Katz v. United States.' ' 65 In describing thejurisdiction of Congress to enact this
legislation, the Committee noted that, as to subsection (a), which prohibits the inter-
ception of both wire and oral communications, "Congress has plenary power under
the commerce clause to prohibit all interception of such communications."'" Congress
considered, however, that this simple and straightforward provision might be chal-
lenged by private individuals who intercepted oral communications. Because oral
..8 See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2153 ("Title III
has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) de-
lineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception
of wire and oral communications may be authorized.").
'9 See id. at 2154. The Committee stated:
The tremendous scientific and technological developments that
have taken place in the last century have made possible today the wide-
spread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques. As a result
of these developments, privacy of communication is seriously jeopar-
dized by these techniques of surveillance. Commercial and employer-
labor espionage is becoming widespread. It is becoming increasingly
difficult to conduct business meetings in private. Trade secrets are be-
trayed. Labor and management plans are revealed. No longer is it pos-
sible, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be left alone.
Every spoken word relating to each man's personal, marital, religious,
political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor
and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advantage.
Id.
'60 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
161 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516 (West Supp. 2007) (entitled "Authorization for interception
of wire, oral, or electronic communication"); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000) (entitled "Procedure
for interception oi wire, oral, or electronic communications").
162 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 (West Supp. 2007) (entitled "Interception and disclosure of wire,
oral, or electronic communications prohibited").
163 See id. § 2511; id. § 2520 (entitled "Recovery of civil damages authorized").
'64 S. REP. No. 90-1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2161-63.
161 Id. at 2113 (citations omitted).
'66 Id. at 2180.
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communications are not necessarily part of interstate or even intrastate commerce,
the interception of these communications might not be justified under the Commerce
Clause unless special circumstances exist.'67 Accordingly, Congress wrote subpara-
graph (b) to address this possible defect in the law and identify specific circumstances
under which it would be illegal for any person to intercept oral communications."~
These circumstances included situations where the device used was linked in any way
to the interstate or foreign network of wire communications; where the listening device
used radio frequencies or interfered with radio transmissions; where the device had
moved through the mail or in interstate commerce; where the interception took place
on or against the premises of any business whose operations affected interstate com-
merce; or if the interception occurred in Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, or any of the
territories or possessions of the United States.' 69
In explaining why it wrote subparagraph (b) prohibiting interception of oral
communications when subparagraph (a) prohibits the interception of both wire and
oral communications, the committee explained that this was necessary in order to give
Congress the power to regulate the activities of private parties. 170 However, it sug-
gested that subparagraph (b) was not necessary to rein in the conduct of government
agents. The Committee stated:
The right here at stake-the right to privacy-is a right arising
under certain provisions of the Bill of Rights and the due process
clause of the 14th amendment. Although the broad prohibitions
of subparagraph (a) could, for example, be constitutionally
applied to the unlawful interception of oral communications by
persons acting under color of State or Federal law, the applica-
tion of the paragraph to other circumstances could in some cases
lead to a constitutional challenge that can be avoided by a clear
statutory specification of an alternative constitutional basis for
the prohibition.' 7 '
In short, when Congress enacted Title m of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, it relied upon the Commerce Clause to regulate the activities of
private parties, but as to persons acting "under color of State or Federal law," Congress
believed that it had an independent source of authority for regulating the interception
of oral or wire communications.
As originally enacted, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act did not attempt
to regulate government eavesdropping conducted for the purpose of protecting national
security. The 1968 Act stated that the law should not
167 See id. at 2180-81 (describing the provisions of subparagraph (b) and explaining why
it was adopted).
16 See id.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 2180.
1'' Id. (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)).
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be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to
take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United
States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other
unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to
the structure or existence of the Government.
72
In 1978, Congress amended Title Ell by repealing the foregoing language and
enacting a new law in its place, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).' 73
FISA required the government to obtain an order from a special court before
conducting electronic surveillance on American citizens or lawful resident aliens. 174
Title III was also amended by adding a provision stating that Title III and the newly-
enacted FISA were the "exclusive means" for allowing the government to conduct
such surveillance.1
7 5
Why was the law changed in 1978? Between 1968 and 1978 came the notorious
administration of President Richard M. Nixon, with its multiple scandals involving
grievous abuses of presidential power. FISA was adopted, and Title I was amended
in reaction to widespread eavesdropping abuses conducted by the Nixon administration
in the name of national security. 76 In particular, three Senate reports set forth this
justification for the adoption of FISA.
172 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978).
173 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
1829 (2000)).
" See 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2000) (requiring the government to submit proof of probable cause
to a special court in order to obtain a warrant to conduct electronic surveillance for the purpose
of gathering foreign intelligence); id. § 1805 (requiring the special court to find the existence
of probable cause to support issuance of a warrant); id. § 1809 (imposing criminal sanctions
upon persons who conduct electronic surveillance in violation of the law); id. § 1810 (imposing
civil liability for the same).
175 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2)(f) (West Supp. 2007) ("[P]rocedures in this chapter or chapter
121 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by
which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of
domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.").
176 See Dianne Carraway Piette & Jesselyn Radack, Piercing the "Historical Mists": The
People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the Creation of the "Wall," 17 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REv. 437 (2006). The authors suggest that FISA was enacted in response to several
factors:
Watergate and the decades of abuse by the executive branch documented
in the comprehensive 1976 Church Committee Report, with its shocking
revelations of surveillance programs targeting American citizens such
as "COINTELPRO," combined with the threat of civil and criminal lia-
bility against individuals in the government and the telephone company,
had a chilling effect on warrantless electronic wiretaps.
Id. at 441-42 (footnotes omitted); Sugiyama & Perry, supra note 6, at 153 ("Congress enacted
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) principally in response to covert intel-
ligence gathering activities conducted during the Nixon administration.").
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In 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations (the
Church Committee) issued its final report describing the abuses of this period.' 77 In
the words of one scholar, the Church Committee "found that government agents often
had violated both Title LH and the Fourth Amendment rights of many citizens by con-
ducting intelligence surveillance without any legitimate basis or suspicion of criminal
activity, much less connection with foreign powers."' 7' The Church Committee pro-
posed that Congress should "turn its attention to legislating restraints upon intelligence
activities which may endanger the constitutional rights of Americans."'
179
In 1977, the Senate Judiciary Committee specifically identified warrantless sur-
veillance as a threat to constitutional rights:
Also formidable-although incalculable-is the "chilling effect"
which warrantless electronic surveillance may have on the consti-
tutional rights of those who were not targets of the surveillance,
but who perceived themselves, whether reasonably or unreason-
ably, as potential targets. Our Bill of Rights is concerned not only
with direct infringements on constitutional rights, but also with
government activities which effectively inhibit the exercise of
these rights. The exercise of political freedom depends in large
measure on citizens' understanding that they will be able to be pub-
licly active and dissent from official policy, within lawful limits,
without having to sacrifice the expectation of privacy that they
rightfully hold. Arbitrary or uncontrolled use of warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance can violate that understanding and impair that
public confidence so necessary to an uninhibited political life.
80
177 See 2 SELECT COMM. TO STUDY Gov'T OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE
SELECT COMMrITEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIvrrIEs: INTELLJGENCE ACTiVriTs AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755
(1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT]; Nicholas C. Dranias, The Patriot Act of
2001 Versus the 1976 Church Committee Report: An Unavoidable Clash of Fundamental
Policy Judgments, CBA REC., Feb./Mar. 2003, at 28. Dranias states:
On April 26, 1976, the Select Committee to Study Governmental Oper-
ations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate
issued its Final Report concerning Intelligence Activities and the Rights
of Americans. Based on extensive documentary evidence and testimony,
this report has since become known as the "Church Committee Report."
Id.
17' Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179, 186 (2003) (citing CHURCH COMMrTrEE
REPORT, supra note 177, at 165).
17" CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 177, at 289; Breglio, supra note 178, at 186.
'1o S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. I, at 8 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,3909-10.
Another problem that the Judiciary Committee noted was that the courts had adopted conflicting
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In 1978, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence stated that the bill before
Congress, which would become FISA, "embodies a legislative judgment that court
orders and other procedural safeguards are necessary to insure that electronic sur-
veillance by the U.S. Government within this country conforms to the fundamental
principles of the fourth amendment."'
8
'
s
Acting upon these reports, Congress enacted FISA in 1978. It is abundantly clear
that FISA was intended to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of American citizens
and lawful resident aliens against encroachment by agents of the federal government
acting under the shield of "national security." Furthermore, as the legislative history
of Title Ill demonstrates, Congress was aware that it had the authority under the
Commerce Clause to prohibit eavesdropping by private parties, but in enacting legis-
lation controlling the actions of state and federal government agents, the Commerce
Clause is an alternative and not a necessary source of congressional power.18 2
Ill. THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM IS ILLEGAL UNDER FISA
After the existence of the warrantless Terrorist Surveillance Program was revealed
in 2005,183 Alberto Gonzales, the Attorney General of the United States, published a
memorandum asserting that the program is lawful under FISA, and in the alternative
that if it is not lawful under FISA, then FISA is unconstitutional under the separation
of powers doctrine.l84 A number of legal scholars have analyzed the Attorney General's
standards for distinguishing between lawful and unlawful eavesdropping. The Senate Committee
stated that "[t]he application of vague and elastic standards for wiretapping and bugging has
resulted in electronic surveillances which, by any objective measure, were improper and seriously
infringed the Fourth Amendment rights of both the targets and those with whom the targets
communicated." Bazan & Elsea, supra note 6, at 13 (citing S. REP. No. 95-604).
"Il S. REP. No. 95-701, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3982.
12 See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
13 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2, at Al (revealing the existence of the Terrorist
Surveillance Program); Sugiyama & Perry, supra note 6, at 149 (calling the disclosure of the
program a "fire alarm"); id. at 158 ("In response to the disclosure by the media of the NSA
domestic surveillance program, the Bush administration built an impenetrable wall around
the executive branch. Although congressional Democrats and various interest groups attempted
to pierce this wall, the majority of Republicans bolstered the executive branch and stymied
these oversight efforts.").
4 See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1383-1409 (contending that FISA should
be interpreted as having been amended by the AUMF); id. at 1376 (stating that if FISA were
interpreted as prohibiting the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program, "FISA would be
unconstitutional as applied to this narrow context"); id. at 1408 ("FISA would be unconsti-
tutional as applied to the current conflict if the canon of constitutional avoidance could not
be used to head off a collision between the Branches."); see also Wong, supra note 6, at 520
("First the administration claims that by passing the AUMF, Congress authorized a broad
range of presidential actions relating to the deterrence and prevention of terrorist acts, of which
the terrorist surveillance program is an 'indispensable aspect.' Second, it claims that even in
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arguments and found them to be unpersuasive. 85 This portion of the Article draws
upon that research in responding to the Attorney General's statutory defense of the
President's Terrorist Surveillance Program. Part IV of this Article addresses the con-
stitutional questions.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales contended that the President's warrantless
Terrorist Surveillance Program does not violate FISA because the requirements of
FISA have been amended or overridden by Congress's enactment of the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF). 186 He also contended that this interpretation of
FISA is required because it is the only interpretation of that statute which would avoid
constitutional difficulties.'87 Neither the text nor the history of FISA and other rele-
vant federal laws support the Attorney General's arguments.
The Attorney General's argument that the Terrorist Surveillance Program does
not violate FISA is based upon a single phrase contained in the provision of FISA
that imposes criminal liability upon public officials who conduct illegal eavesdropping.
This provision states, "A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally engages in
electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute." '18
The Attorney General took the position that the phrase "except as authorized by
statute" indicates that the requirements of FISA may be modified or repealed by a
subsequent statute. 189 He argued that the AUMF had this effect, essentially repealing
FISA's prohibition on warrantless eavesdropping in the context of the war on terror."
The AUMF was enacted on September 18, 2001, precisely one week after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.191 It states:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
the absence of congressional authorization, the Commander-in-Chief Clause in Article II of
the Constitution confers the power to approve the type of warrantless surveillance conducted
under the terrorist surveillance program." (footnotes omitted)).
185 See sources cited supra note 6.
186 See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1383-1401 (contending AUMF by its terms
amended FISA); see also Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001).
187 See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1401-09 (invoking the canon of consti-
tutional avoidance).
188 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
189 See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1393 ("In enacting FISA, therefore,
Congress contemplated the possibility that the President might be permitted to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance pursuant to a later-enacted statute that did not incorporate all of the proce-
dural requirements set forth in FISA or that did not expressly amend FISA itself.").
'90 See id. at 1383-1409.
'9' Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations
or persons. 92
In opposition to the President's position and the Attorney General's arguments,
a number of legal scholars have concluded that the NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program
is illegal under FISA. 9 3 Specifically, these scholars conclude that it is not reasonable
to read the AUMF as either an implicit modification or repeal of FISA. 94 There are
at least six reasons that support this conclusion.
First, the language of FISA and the Omnibus Crime Control Act is clear and un-
ambiguous, as was the intent of Congress in the enactment of each law. When FISA
was adopted, Congress repealed a provision that exempted surveillance conducted
in the name of "national security" from the scope of the Omnibus Crime Control Act
and replaced it with language providing that the warrant procedures of Title MI1 and
FISA were the "exclusive means" for the government to conduct lawful interception
of communications. 95 Both the plain meaning and clear legislative intent militate
against the President's position that the general language of the AUMF implicitly
repeals the specific language of Title III and FISA.
19 6
Second, the language and the legislative history of the AUMF do not support the
proposition that the AUMF covers surveillance of the conversations of Americans.
The resolution authorizes the use of "force," and the plain meaning of the term "force"
does not include the wiretapping of American citizens. 9 Nor does case law militate
192 Id. § 2(a).
'9' See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 6, at 1364 ("[T]he Justice Department's defense of
what it concedes was secret and warrantless electronic surveillance of persons within the
United States fails to identify any plausible legal authority for such surveillance."); Sims, supra
note 6, at 106 (stating that "the conclusion that [the Terrorist Surveillance Program] violates
the law as it stands is unavoidable").
'9' See Bradley et al., supra note 6, at 1365 ("Congress did not implicitly authorize the
NSA domestic spying program in the AUMF, and in fact expressly prohibited it in FISA.");
Sims, supra note 6, at 140 ("The AUMF cannot plausibly be taken to have provided statutory
authorization for warrantless interceptions under these circumstances."); Bazan & Elsea, supra
note 6, at 43 ("The history of Congress's active involvement in regulating electronic surveil-
lance within the United States leaves little room for arguing that Congress has accepted by
acquiescence the NSA operations here at issue."); id. at 44 ("[I]t appears unlikely that a court
would hold that Congress has expressly or impliedly authorized the NSA electronic surveillance
operations here under discussion .... ).
9 See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
'9 See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 6, at 1365 ("Specific and 'carefully drawn' statutes
prevail over general statutes where there is a conflict." (citation omitted)).
"9 See, e.g., id. ("[T]he DOJ's argument rests on an unstated general 'implication' from the
AUMF that directly contradicts express and specific language in FISA."); Bazan & Elsea, supra
note 6, at 35-36 (analyzing the meaning of the term "force").
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in favor of an expansive definition of the term "force." In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the
Supreme Court ruled that the AUMF necessarily authorizes the detention of combat-
ants captured on the battlefield for the duration of the conflict but said that it would
not authorize the indefinite detention of prisoners. 9 Two years later, in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the Court ruled that the AUMF did not authorize the President to subject
prisoners to war crimes trials that did not conform to the requirements of Article 21 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.'" Furthermore, when the AUMF was debated
and adopted, there was no mention of FISA on the floor of Congress.200 To the con-
trary, the President sought to add language that would have authorized him to use all
necessary force "in the United States," and Congress rejected this proposal.20'
Third, after the adoption of the AUMF in 2001, Congress amended FISA in several
respects when it enacted and reauthorized the Patriot Act.20 2 Although Congress has
198 542 U.S. 507,521 (2004) (ruling that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay were entitled
to a hearing to determine whether they are "enemy combatants"). The Court stated:
Hamdi contends that the AUMF does not authorize indefinite or perpetual
detention. Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose
of interrogation is not authorized. Further, we understand Congress'
grant of authority for the use of "necessary and appropriate force" to
include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict,
and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles.
Id.; see also id. at 536 ("We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check
for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.").
'99 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006) ("[T]here is nothing in the text or legislative history of
the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization set forth
in Article 21 of the UCMJ.").
200 See Sims, supra note 6, at 132 ("[A]t no time in the legislative process that led to the
AUMF was there the slightest hint that the operation of FISA would in any way be affected.").
201 See Morrison, supra note 6, at 1255. Professor Morrison states:
Just before the Senate voted on the AUMF, the White House reportedly
sought to insert the words "in the United States and" into the resolution,
so that it would authorize the President to "use all necessary and appro-
priate force in the United States and against those nations, organizations,
or persons" responsible for the September 11 attacks. But the Senate
leadership refused, apparently on the grounds that it did not want to grant
the President expansive powers within the United States.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
202 See, e.g., Sims, supra note 6, at 132 (stating that FISA "has been explicitly amended
by Congress five times since 9/11"); Sugiyama & Perry, supra note 6, at 155. The authors
state:
In response to the terrorist attacks, President Bush signed Public Law
107-56, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT
Act) on October 26, 2001. The Act includes several significant amend-
ments to FISA. First, the amendments approve searches where criminal
prosecution of individuals is the primary purpose of the search, so long
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made a number of significant changes to FISA since 2001, it has retained the require-
ment that the government obtain a warrant from the FISA court before "United States
persons" may be targeted for surveillance.2"3 This legislative history is strong evi-
dence that Congress did not intend for the AUMF to repeal the warrant requirements
of FISA.204
Fourth, canons of construction such as the doctrine of "constitutional avoidance"
are rules of inference that may be invoked only to resolve ambiguities in a statute;
they may not be used to create substantive exceptions to statutes which are clear on
their face.205 Accordingly, the doctrine of "constitutional avoidance" is not applicable
in this setting.2 °4
Fifth, FISA contains at least two exceptions which allow the President to respond
to emergencies. 207 It provides for a fifteen-day suspension of the law following a
congressional declaration of war.20 Even if the AUMF could be construed as a
"declaration of war," at most this would mean that the President would not have had
to seek warrants from the FISA court for fifteen days following the adoption of the
as a significant intelligence purpose remains. These amendments repre-
sent a fundamental shift in focus from FISA as a tool for surveillance
to FISA as a tool for law enforcement. The government, therefore, need
no longer cloak its prosecutorial interests in the guise of foreign intelli-
gence; the bar for initiating surveillance is much lower. Second, the Act
increases the number ofjudges on the FISA court from seven to eleven.
Third, the Act expands FISA's coverage with respect to certain data
gathering devices and business records. Finally, the Act also amends
FISA to include a private right of action for private citizens who are
illegally monitored.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally Viet D. Dinh & Wendy J. Keefer, FISA and the
PATRIOTAct: A Look Back and a Look Forward, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii
(2006) (describing how numerous provisions of the Patriot Act have amended FISA).
203 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (West Supp. 2007).
204 See, e.g., Bazan & Elsea, supra note 6, at 37 ("The fact that Congress amended FISA
subsequent to September 11,2001, in order to maximize its effectiveness against the terrorist
threat further bolsters the notion that FISA is intended to remain fully applicable.").
205 See WILsON R. HuHN, THE FivETYPES OFLEGALARGUMENT 99 (2002); Morrison, supra
note 6, at 1194 ("[Tlhe avoidance canon applies only in circumstances of statutory ambiguity.");
Bazan & Elsea, supra note 6, at 41 (stating that principles of statutory construction "are only
to be applied where there is a genuine ambiguity or conflict between two statutes").
206 See Morrison, supra note 6, at 1250-58 (analyzing and rejecting the President's
"constitutional avoidance" defense); id. at 1258 ("[TIimely and appropriate notice to Congress
is a critical predicate of the constitutional enforcement theory of avoidance. In the absence of
such notice, the Justice Department's avoidance-based defense of the NSA program simply
cannot get off the ground.").
207 See Bazan & Elsea, supra note 6, at 23-27 (describing three of FISA's exceptions to
the warrant requirement).
208 See 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
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AUMF. °9 In light of this provision, it cannot reasonably be maintained that FISA was
permanently superceded by the AUMF.2 1° FISA also contains a seventy-two hour grace
period allowing the government to conduct surveillance in situations where it is not
feasible to obtain a warrant.2 ' This is additional proof that Congress anticipated the
need to suspend the warrant requirement in emergency situations and deliberately
decided not to permanently suspend FISA in time of war.
Sixth, in light of the fact that the President conducted the Terrorist Surveillance
Program in secret, it cannot be maintained that Congress implicitly approved of the
President's action. Only a few select members of Congress were informed of the exis-
tence of the program, and they were bound to secrecy.212 Neither the American people
nor their elected representatives were conscious of the President's orders or the govern-
ment's actions. In fact, in the spring of 2004, President George W. Bush lied to the
American people, stating:
Now, by the way, any time you hear the United States Government
talking about wiretap, it requires-a wiretap requires a court order
[sic]. Nothing has changed, by the way. When we're talking
about chasing down terrorists, we're talking about getting a court
order before we do so. It's important for our fellow citizens to
understand, when you think PATRIOT Act, constitutional guar-
antees are in place when it comes to doing what is necessary to
protect our homeland, because we value the Constitution." 3
It is not possible to infer from Congress's inaction that it intended to ratify the
lawfulness of the warrantless surveillance program.214
The plain and unambiguous language of FISA and Title In of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act as well as the unmistakable evidence of Congress's intent lead to but one
conclusion: the President's warrantless eavesdropping program is in violation of
209 See Bazan & Elsea, supra note 6, at 26 ('This provision does not appear to apply to the
AUMF, as that does not constitute a congressional declaration of war.").
20 See id. at 37 ("The inclusion of this exception strongly suggests that Congress intended
for FISA to apply even during wartime, unless Congress were to pass new legislation.").
21 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(f) (West Supp. 2007).
22 See Morrison, supra note 6, at 1258 ("[V]ery few members of Congress knew of its
existence."). See generally Sugiyama & Perry, supra note 6 (describing and analyzing
Congressional oversight of the NSA surveillance program).
213 See Remarks in a Discussion on the PATRIOT Act in Buffalo, New York, 40 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. Doc. 638, 641 (Apr. 20, 2004).
214 See Morrison, supra note 6, at 1258. The author states that "timely and appropriate
notice to Congress is a critical predicate of the constitutional enforcement theory of avoidance.
In the absence of such notice, the Justice Department's avoidance-based defense of the NSA
program simply cannot get off the ground." Id.
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federal law.2"5 Those persons who have ordered, approved, or conducted this sur-
veillance may be guilty of committing felonies in violation of FISA.216
In defense of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the President contends that
FISA is unconstitutional under the doctrine of separation of powers because it inter-
feres with the power of the President to protect this nation from hostile powers.2 7
That issue is addressed in the following and final portion of this Article.
IV. FISA Is CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
The President presents two arguments under the doctrine of separation of powers
to justify his claim that FISA is unconstitutional and that the Terrorist Surveillance
Program is therefore legal. First, he contends that he has the inherent authority, under
the Constitution, to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance,2"8 because
"Article II of the Constitution vests in the President all executive power of the United
States, including the power to act as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and
authority over the conduct of the Nation's foreign affairs. 21 9 The President, in effect,
invokes the theory of the "unitary executive," which is premised upon a broad reading
of the executive power. 220 The President's understanding of the theory of the unitary
executive is that he has discretion to perform the duties of his office largely free from
the control of the other branches of government, at least with respect to any matter
connected to foreign affairs. 221 Therefore, the President argues not simply for a
215 See Sims, supra note 6, at 128-29.
216 See 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000) (making it a federal offense for any person, acting "under
color of law," to intercept communications in violation of FISA).
217 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
218 See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1379 ("The President has inherent consti-
tutional authority to order warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance.").
219 Id.
220 See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During
the First Half-Century, 47 CASEW. REs. L. REV. 1451 (1997) (setting forth the theory of the
unitary executive and the actions of Presidents during the relevant period of American history);
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-
Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 667 (2003) (same); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G.
Calabresi, & Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century,
1889-1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2004) (same); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G.
Calabresi, & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modem Era, 1945-2004,
90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005) (same).
221 See Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking,
54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 311-12 (2006) ("[S]ome have argued that in matters of foreign affairs,
the president possesses inherent, perhaps even extraconstitutional, powers. Recent expansive
assertions of implied executive authority by the present administration against the backdrop
of national security considerations have also added a particularly combustible fuel to the
controversy." (footnote omitted)).
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
"unified executive," but for a "unified government," which is completely at odds with
the concept of separation of powers.
This broad reading of the "executive power," both generally and in the context
of warrantless surveillance during wartime, is refuted by the decision of the Supreme
Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.222 In that case the four great
Justices from that period-Hugo Black, William Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, and
Robert Jackson, each of whom had been appointed by President Franklin Delano
RooseveltE23-all authored opinions standing for the proposition that the President
must be obedient to the rule of law, even in time of war.224
The President's second argument is more subtle. He suggests that separation of
powers struggles must take into account the centrality and importance of the powers
being exercised by each branch.225 Essentially, he contends that the conduct of for-
eign surveillance is more important and more central to the duties of the President as
Commander in Chief than it is to the power of Congress to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce.226 This argument is rebutted by the central point of this Article-
that Congress has the power to enact legislation to protect the Bill of Rights, and
Congress exercised this power when it adopted FISA.227
The President's two arguments under the separation of powers doctrine and the
responses to those claims are the subjects, respectively, of Part A and Part B below.
Part C discusses Justice Anthony Kennedy's theory of the relationship between the
separation of powers doctrine and the liberty of the individual.
A. The President's Theory of the Unitary Executive and the Ruling of the
Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
President George W. Bush has, at every opportunity, promoted an extreme version
of the theory of the unitary executive. 228 The term unitary executive is derived from
222 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see Sims, supra note 6, at 134 ("The celebrated Steel Seizure Case
is the precedent most nearly on point, and it offers no support at all for the proposition that
FISA is unconstitutional .... ").
223 See generally WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, THE GREAT JUSTICES 1941-1954: BLACK,
DOUGLAS, FRANKFURTER, & JACKSON IN CHAMBERS (2006) (describing the interaction and
the achievements of these four Justices).
224 See infra notes 244-66 and accompanying text.
225 See infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
226 See infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
227 See infra Part IV.B.
228 See Yoo, Calabresi, & Colangelo, supra note 220, at 729-30. The authors state:
Support for the unitariness of the executive branch does not neces-
sarily require supporting the broad claims of inherent executive authority
advanced by the Bush Administration. Even Justice Antonin Scalia,
whose dissent in Morrison v. Olson remains one of the definitive state-
ments in support of the unitary executive, took the view [in Hamdi v.
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the decision of the Framers of the Constitution to vest the executive power in a single
person instead of a committee. 229 Proponents of this theory have traditionally criti-
cized any attempt by Congress to control the exercise of executive power by limiting
the power of the President to appoint or remove members of the executive branch.23°
In particular, the adherents to the theory of the unitary executive have opposed two
decisions of the Supreme Court that upheld limitations on the President's appointment
and removal powers.23' In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, the Supreme Court
upheld a provision of federal law that prevented the President from removing a Federal
Trade Commissioner at will, by providing that a Trade Commissioner "may be re-
moved by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. 232
This decision cleared the way for the creation of "independent agencies" within the
executive branch, including the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Reserve
Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.233 The other decision that
Rumsfeld] that citizens detained as enemy combatants must be either
charged with treason or be released, absent a congressional act suspend-
ing the right to habeas corpus.
The fact the Bush Administration has made such extraordinary claims
of presidential power--claims that go way beyond a claim of control
over the removal and law execution powers defended in this Article-
shows that there has been no acquiescence in any diminution in presi-
dential power during the Administration of George W. Bush. The fact
that at times Bush may have pushed an overly vigorous view of presiden-
tial power that expanded far beyond the logical boundaries of the unitary
executive implicitly confirms his determination to defend the prerogatives
of the executive branch.
Id.
229 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 50, at 81-82, 85-86 (describing debate at the
Constitutional Convention regarding the number of persons who would lead the executive
branch); THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 384-85 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Those politicians and
statesmen, who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles, and for
the justness of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive, and a numerous
Legislature.").
230 See sources cited supra note 220.
231 See Yoo, Calabresi, & Colangelo, supra note 220, at 730 (characterizing the dissent of
Justice Antonin Scalia in Morrison v. Olson as "one of the definitive statements in support of
the unitary executive"); Yoo, Calabresi, & Nee, supra note 220, at 88 (stating that "Humphrey's
Executor was a shocking and poorly reasoned" decision).
232 295 U.S. 602, 619 (1935) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1934)); see id. at 632 ("[Als to
officers of the kind here under consideration, we hold that no removal can be made during
the prescribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one or more of the causes
named in the applicable statute.").
233 Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron
Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 443 (2006). The author states:
Ever since the Supreme Court held in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States that at least certain "good cause" statutory limitations on the
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supporters of the theory of the unitary executive consider to be incorrect is
Morrison v. Olson, in which the Court upheld the Independent Counsel Act which
permitted the appointment of prosecutors who were not under the direct control of
the Attorney General.3
However, the administration of President George W. Bush has eclipsed this
traditional understanding of the theory of the unitary executive. 235 Elements within
the administration, as well as the President himself, have made claims which are far in
excess of those which supporters of the theory have previously advanced.236 Members
of the Justice Department have produced memoranda supporting the inherent power
of the President to detain suspected terrorists, torture them during interrogation, try
them for war crimes, and even to invade other countries without congressional authori-
zation.237 In addition, the President has invoked the doctrine of the unitary executive
in many signing statements, in which he argued that the theory of the unitary executive
authorized him to disregard the laws that he was signing.23
President's power to remove a member of the FTC were constitutional,
agencies such as the FTC and the FCC have been considered in at least
some good measure, as a matter of law and established practice, "free
from executive control."
Id.
234 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the Act against challenge on ground that law invaded
the powers of the President as head of the executive branch).
235 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
236 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
237 See Van Alstine, supra note 221, at 312 n.8 (identifying a number of administration
memoranda invoking the "inherent" powers of the President); Memorandum from John C. Yoo,
Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen. to Timothy Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the President (Sept. 25, 2001),
in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 3, 3 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) (concluding that "the President may deploy military force preemptively
against terrorist organizations or the States that harbor or support them, whether or not they
can be linked to the specific terrorist incidents of September 11"); Letter from John C. Yoo,
Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen. to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in
THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 218 (concluding that interrogation methods used on captured
al Qaeda operatives would not violate the Convention on Torture, nor would they result in
possible prosecution before the International Criminal Court); Memorandum from Jay S.
Bybee, Ass't Att'y Gen. to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in
THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 172, 214 (construing federal laws that outlaw cruel and
inhuman treatment of prisoners, and concluding that "under the circumstances of the current
war against al Queda and its allies, application of Section 2340A [the federal law outlawing
torture] to interrogations undertaken pursuant to the President's Commander-in-Chief power
may be unconstitutional. Finally, even if an interrogation might violate Section 2340A, necessity
or self-defense could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal liability").
238 See Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARv.
L. REv. 597, 601 (2006) (proposing that signing statements should be considered by courts
when interpreting statutes, but noting, "[a] similarly pervasive but more controversial pur-
pose of signing statements is to express the President's position that a particular provision
[Vol. 16:537
CONGRESS HAS POWER TO ENFORCE BILL OF RIGHTS
The principal authority opposing the concept of the unitary executive is con-
tained in the opinions of several Justices who comprised the majority of the Supreme
Court in the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.239 In that case the
Supreme Court unequivocally declared that the President must obey the law even
during wartime.
The Youngstown case may be briefly summarized. During the Korean War,
unionized steel workers threatened to go on a nation-wide strike, leading President
Harry Truman to issue an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take
possession of the nation's steel mills to keep the mills running.240 Five years earlier,
Congress had considered a bill that would have authorized the President to take this
type of action but refused to enact the law. 24' President Truman reported his action
of seizing the steel mills to Congress and invited response, but Congress took no
action. 2 The owners of the steel mills challenged the validity of the President's order,
and the President argued that he had the authority as Chief Executive and Commander
or application of a bill is unconstitutional and therefore will not be enforced by the executive
branch"); Emma V. Broomfield, Note, A Failed Attempt to Circumvent the International Law
on Torture: The Insignificance of Presidential Signing Statements Under The Paquete Habana,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 105, 110 (2006). The author stated:
President Bush signed the Detainee Treatment Act into law on
December 30, 2005. But President Bush qualified his signature with a
statement providing that the executive branch would construe the CIDT
provision in accordance with "the constitutional authority of the President
to supervise the unitary executive branch" and with the commander-in-
chief power, effectively stipulating that he could violate the ban when
he judged it necessary for the protection of national security.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Charlie Savage, ABA Urges Halt to "Signing Statements," BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 9, 2006, at A2 ("Among the laws Bush has challenged are a torture ban, oversight
provisions in the USA Patriot Act, restrictions against using US soldiers to fight Colombian
rebels, whistleblower protections for executive branch employees, safeguards against political
interference in federally funded scientific research, and numerous other statutory restrictions
or requirements on his powers.").
239 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
240 Id. at 583.
241 Id. at 586. Justice Black stated:
Moreover, the use of the seizure technique to solve labor disputes in order
to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congres-
sional enactment; prior to this controversy, Congress had refused to adopt
that method of settling labor disputes. When the Taft-Hartley Act was
under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which
would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency.
Id.
242 Id. at 583 ("The next morning the President sent a message to Congress reporting his
action. Twelve days later he sent a second message. Congress has taken no action.").
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in Chief to seize the mills in support of the war effort.243 The Supreme Court ruled
against the President.2" The majority opinion was written by Justice Hugo Black.
Justice Black commenced his analysis of the separation of powers aspect of the
case with the observation that "[t]he President's power, if any, to issue the order must
stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."245 President
Truman did not contend that Congress had enacted any laws that gave him the power
to seize the steel industry, but rather he argued that the seizure was an exercise of the
President's constitutional authority to defend the nation during a time of war.2" Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Black concluded that no provision of the Constitution gave
the President the power to seize the nation's private assets under these circumstances
and that the seizure was therefore illegal.247
Looking to the text of the Constitution, Justice Black ruled that the language of
both Article I and Article II of the Constitution was in opposition to the President's
assertion of power.2" Justice Black rejected the contention that the President, as
Commander in Chief, had the authority to seize the nation's steel industry, stating:
Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we can-
not with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power
as such to take possession of private property in order to keep
labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the
Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.249
Justice Black observed that the Constitution grants Congress the power to make
law,250 and that the Necessary and Proper Clause invests Congress with the power to
243 See id. at 587. Justice Black stated:
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it
must be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed
that express constitutional language grants this power to the President.
The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the
aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is
placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power
shall be vested in a President.. ."; that "he shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed"; and that he "shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States."
Id.
'44 Id. at 589.
245 Id. at 585.
24 See id. at 585-86.
247 See id. at 587-88 (considering and rejecting the President's assertion of constitutional
authority to seize the steel industry); id. at 589 ("[T]his seizure order cannot stand.").
248 See id. at 587-88.
249 Id. at 587.
250 See id. at 588 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1); id. at 589 ("The Founders of this Nation
580 [Vol. 16:537
CONGRESS HAS POWER TO ENFORCE BILL OF RIGHTS
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof., 25' He also cited the
provision of Article II of the Constitution which, in emphatic terms, imposes a duty
upon the President to enforce the law, providing that the President "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed. 252 He concluded that this provision "refutes
the idea that [the President] is to be a lawmaker., 253 Justice Black reasoned that
Congress, not the President, had the power to deal with the crisis facing the nation:
The power of Congress to adopt such public policies as those
proclaimed by the order is beyond question. It can authorize the
taking of private property for public use. It can make laws regu-
lating the relationships between employers and employees, pre-
scribing rules designed to settle labor disputes, and fixing wages
and working conditions in certain fields of our economy. The
Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress
to presidential or military supervision or control.254
Justice Douglas and Justice Frankfurter joined Justice Black's opinion for the
majority,255 and in separate concurring opinions they both expressed the idea that a
system of government that incorporates the doctrine of separation of powers might not
be the most efficient form of government, but that it is necessary to preserve freedom.26
entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would
do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that
lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order
cannot stand.").
25! Id. at 588 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.18).
252 Id. at 587 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
253 id.
254 Id. at 588.
255 See id. at 589 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Although the considerations relevant to the
legal enforcement of the principle of separation of powers seem to me more complicated and
flexible than may appear from what Mr. Justice Black has written, I join his opinion because
I thoroughly agree with the application of the principle to the circumstances of this case."); id.
at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
256 See id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("We pay a price for our system of checks and
balances .... ."); id. at 629 ("The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power."
(quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). In his
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter stated:
A scheme of government like ours no doubt at times feels the lack of
power to act with complete, all-embracing, swiftly moving authority. No
doubt a government with distributed authority, subject to be challenged
in the courts of law, at least long enough to consider and adjudicate the
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The separate concurring opinion of Justice Robert H. Jackson in Youngstown has
come to be viewed as the leading statement of the theory of separation of powers.257
Earlier in his career Justice Jackson had frequently scaled heights of eloquence,258 but
the opinion in Youngstown, written two years before his death, is, in my opinion, his
masterpiece. A few excerpts from Jackson's opinion illustrate why it has achieved
such influence. Justice Jackson wrote:
There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate
that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will con-
stitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries
and its inhabitants.259
The third clause in which the Solicitor General finds seizure
powers is that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.... ." That authority must be matched against words of the
Fifth Amendment that "No person shall be... deprived of life,
challenge, labors under restrictions from which other governments are
free. It has not been our tradition to envy such governments. In any
event our government was designed to have such restrictions. The price
was deemed not too high in view of the safeguards which these
restrictions afford.
Id. at 613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
257 See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 777
(E.D. Mich. 2006) ("Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in that case has become historic."),
rev'dfor lack of standing, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Laura K. Ray, A Law Clerk and His
Justice: What William Rehnquist Did Not Learn from Robert Jackson, 29 IND. L. REV. 535,
564 (1996) (stating that Justice Jackson's concurring opinion overshadowed Justice Black's
more circumscribed opinion for the Court"); Jeffrey Rudd, Restructuring America's Government
to Create Sustainable Development, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 371,398,400
(2006) (arguing that "Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown presents a classic analysis
of the constitutional limits of presidential powers and his opinion's significance extends well
beyond national security issues," and characterizing it as "[o]ne of Jackson's great contributions
to American government").
258 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us."); DOMNARSKI, supra note 223, at 41
("Jackson's was a muscular, concrete, tactile prose that in its purest expressions startles the
reader with its vigor, edge, and essence."); JEFFREY D. HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE
CONSTITUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO L. BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND ROBERT
H. JACKSON 241 (1996) ("Early in his judicial career, Jackson distinguished himself through
the eloquence and force of his prose.").
259 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. ." One gives
a governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law, the
other gives a private right that authority shall go no farther. These
signify about all there is of the principle that ours is a government
of laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only
if under rules.2"
The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inherent
powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us to do what
many think would be wise, although it is something the forefathers
omitted. They knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures
they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford
a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they sus-
pected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.26'
The essence of our free Government is "leave to live by no man's
leave, underneath the law"-to be governed by those impersonal
forces which we call law. Our Government is fashioned to fulfill
this concept so far as humanly possible. The Executive, except for
recommendation and veto, has no legislative power. The execu-
tive action we have here originates in the individual will of the
President and represents an exercise of authority without law. No
one, perhaps not even the President, knows the limits of the power
he may seek to exert in this instance and the parties affected cannot
learn the limit of their rights. We do not know today what powers
over labor or property would be claimed to flow from Government
possession if we should legalize it, what rights to compensation
would be claimed or recognized, or on what contingency it would
end. With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have dis-
covered no technique for long preserving free government except
that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by
parliamentary deliberations.
Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the
duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.262
The core of Jackson's analysis, and in my opinion his most enduring legacy, is
the "tripartite approach" that he developed towards separation of powers problems.
260 id. at 646.
261 Id. at 649-50.
262 Id. at 654-55 (footnote omitted).
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Jackson identified three situations where the power of the President might be chal-
lenged. When Congress has approved or acquiesced in the action of the President, the
President's power "is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate.2 63 When Congress has remained silent while
the President has taken action, it may "enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility."264 Finally, "[wihen the President takes measures incom-
patible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can only rely upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter., 265 Justice Jackson found that President Truman's
seizure of the steel industry was contrary to the will of Congress, and that it could be
justified only by the severe tests under the third grouping, where
it can be supported only by any remainder of executive power after
subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over the sub-
ject. In short, we can sustain the President only by holding that
seizure of such strike-bound industries is within his domain and
beyond control by Congress.264
The Steel Seizure case governs the dispute over the Terrorist Surveillance Program.
In fact, President Bush is on even weaker ground than President Truman was in his
assertion of inherent constitutional authority. In Youngstown, the Supreme Court
inferred that Congress had withheld authority from the President to seize industrial
property because Congress had declined to enact a statute which would have conferred
this power.267 In the present case, Congress has enacted a law which not only prohibits
wiretapping without a warrant, but which makes this conduct a serious federal crime. 261
Furthermore, in Youngstown, President Truman reported his action to Congress and
invited it to act.269 In the present case, President Bush concealed the program of elec-
tronic surveillance and declined to exercise his constitutional authority to propose
authorizing legislation. 270 Accordingly, it is even clearer than it was in Youngstown
that this matter is governed by Justice Jackson's "third grouping," and the President's
power is at its "lowest ebb., 27' Following Jackson's analysis, the surveillance program
would be constitutional only if this matter were "beyond control by Congress. '272 Just
263 Id. at 635.
264 Id. at 637.
265 id.
266 Id. at 640.
267 Id. at 586 (majority opinion).
268 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (West Supp. 2007); see supra
notes 173-89 and accompanying text.
269 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583.
270 See supra notes 212-22 and accompanying text.
271 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
272 See id. at 640.
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as it had the power to regulate the steel industry under the Commerce Clause, Congress
unquestionably has power to regulate the communications industry.273 Accordingly,
it cannot be said that electronic eavesdropping is "beyond control by Congress." '274
Under Justice Jackson's analysis, FISA is constitutional and the President's warrant-
less eavesdropping program is illegal.
Another parallel between the Steel Seizure case and the dispute over the Terrorist
Surveillance Program is that the President's actions infringe upon fundamental rights.
The seizure of the steel industry constituted a possible deprivation of property without
due process of law,275 while the warrantless interception of confidential communications
affects the right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. 7 6 In neither case was
the President authorized by Congress to infringe upon protected rights.
In support of his extreme version of the theory of the unitary executive, President
Bush cites language from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, a de-
cision predating Youngstown that broadly characterizes the President as "the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations." '277 However, an examination of the facts
in that case and close attention to the language of the Court's opinion unequivocally
indicate that the case does not stand for the proposition that the President has the
authority to disregard or disobey federal laws when, in his opinion, it is appropriate
to do so in defense of the nation.
First, the facts in Curtiss-Wright did not involve a President acting in opposition
to a congressional enactment, but rather it was a case where Congress had specifically
delegated power to the President. In 1934, Congress adopted a Joint Resolution
giving the President authority to determine whether it would contribute to peace to
prohibit the sale of weapons to the combatants in a conflict in South America.278 If
the President were to make this determination, then it would become a federal offense
to sell or deliver weapons to the region.279 The issue in Curtiss-Wright was not, as in
the case of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, whether the President has the authority
to override a congressional directive, but rather the issue was whether it violated the
Constitution for Congress to delegate power to the President to declare certain conduct
to be a crime.280
2" See Sims, supra note 6, at 135.
274 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
275 See supra note 260 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Jackson's reference to the
Fifth Amendment in Youngstown).
276 See supra notes 155-83 and accompanying text.
.77 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (upholding
congressional resolution granting the President the authority to declare gun-running to certain
countries to be a federal crime).
278 See id. at 311-12.
279 See id. (quoting the Joint Resolution).
280 Id. at 315 ("[A]ppellees urge that Congress abdicated its essential functions and delegated
them to the Executive.").
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Furthermore, the language in Curtiss-Wright referring to the President as the "sole
organ" of the United States in international relations cannot reasonably be interpreted
as conferring upon the President the power to violate federal law relating to wiretaps.
It is apparent from the entire passage in Curtiss-Wright that the Supreme Court was
speaking of the role of the President as our representative to other nations.28' The
entire passage in which the "sole organ" language appears is as follows:
[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a repre-
sentative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of
negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is power-
less to invade it. As [John] Marshall said in his great argument
of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The President
is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations." The Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations at a very early day in our history (February 15,
1816), reported to the Senate, among other things, as follows:
"The President is the constitutional representative of the
United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our con-
cerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent
to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may
be urged with the greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he
is responsible to the Constitution. The committee consider this
responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful discharge of his
duty. They think the interference of the Senate in the direction
of foreign negotiations calculated to diminish that responsibility
and thereby to impair the best security for the national safety. The
nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires
caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends
on secrecy and dispatch. 2 2
The holding of the Court in Curtiss-Wright stands for the proposition that Congress
may, if it chooses, delegate certain powers to the President in the field of foreign affairs
that it could not grant to him domestically. The obiter dictum of the opinion stating
that the President is the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations" merely
confirms that the President is the chief ambassador of the nation-its voice and its
negotiator-with other nations. This case does not grant the President any power to
disregard federal law.
In summary, the theory of the unitary executive may legitimately call into question
decisions of the Supreme Court that allow Congress to interfere with the power of
28 See id. at319.
282 Id. (citations omitted).
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the President to appoint or remove members of the executive branch, but this theory
cannot be distorted into a principle that allows the President to violate the law. The
very description of the office of the Presidency as that of the "chief executive" and the
nature of the power that is vested in the President-the "executive power"-refute
the pretensions of the current President to extralegal power. "Executive power" is
the power to execute the law. It is not the power to violate the law.
B. The Centrality of Eavesdropping to the Functions of the Executive and
Legislative Branches
As noted above, the President makes another argument under the doctrine of
separation of powers that is more subtle than the theory of the unitary executive and
offers an ingenious way around Justice Jackson's tripartite analysis of separation of
powers cases.2"3
The President's argument is very simple. He contends that the activity that is in
question in this case-wiretapping in defense of the national security-is central to the
powers and duties that the Constitution vests in the office of the Presidency and that
Congress's regulation of this same activity is peripheral, at best, to the powers and
duties that the Constitution vests in Congress. Accordingly, FISA is unconstitutional
under the separation of powers doctrine.
In defense of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, Attorney General Gonzales
contended that the defense of this nation and the concomitant collection of foreign
intelligence is a core executive function, while at the same time implying that the
enactment of FISA is not the performance of a core congressional function.284 The
Attorney General stated:
Youngstown involved an assertion of executive power that not
only stretched far beyond the President's core Commander in
Chief functions, but that did so by intruding into areas where
Congress had been given an express, and apparently dominant,
role by the Constitution.
The present situation differs dramatically. The exercise of
executive authority involved in the NSA activities is not several
steps removed from the actual conduct of a military campaign. As
explained above, it is an essential part of the military campaign.
Unlike the activities at issue in Youngstown, the NSA activities
are directed at the enemy, and not at domestic activity that might
283 See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
284 See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1406-07 (distinguishing the seizure of the
steel mills in Youngstown from the warrantless wiretapping by the NSA on the basis of its
relation to executive and legislative functions).
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incidentally aid the war effort. And assertion of executive author-
ity here does not involve extending presidential power into areas
reserved for Congress.285
Essentially, the President and the Attorney General contend that the subject
which is under discussion is at the core of presidential power, while at the periphery
of congressional power.
The central purpose of this Article is to address this argument. Part I argues that
Congress has the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal government,
while Part II contends that Congress exercised this power when it enacted FISA. Like
the regulation of business that Congress undertakes pursuant to the Commerce Clause,
the protection of rights is a "core function" of Congress. The enactment of FISA is
central to Congress's role as a defender of the Bill of Rights. Congress was consti-
tutionally authorized to adopt FISA not merely by the Commerce Clause, but also
by its plenary power to enforce the Bill of Rights against infringement by the federal
government. In my opinion, this effectively rebuts the Attorney General's argument
regarding "centrality," and it lends considerable strength to the proposition that FISA
does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Nor does it make any difference, insofar as the power of Congress is concerned,
whether the Terrorist Surveillance Program violates the Fourth Amendment. In August
of 2006, in the case American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that the President's
warrantless eavesdropping program violates the First and Fourth Amendments to the
Constitution.286 I agree with the conclusion of the district court. But even if the deci-
sion is wrong-even if the Supreme Court were to find that the Terrorist Surveillance
Program does not, in and of itself, violate the Fourth Amendment--Congress had the
authority to enact FISA, because under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress
has discretion to enlarge its protection of the Bill of Rights against encroachment by
federal agencies and officers.287 When Congress enacts laws that are prohibitory upon
the states pursuant to its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must
enact laws that are "congruent with" and "proportionate to" the underlying rights that
285 Id.
286 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 773-76 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding the Terrorist Surveillance
Program to be unconstitutional), rev'dfor lack of standing, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
the Terrorist Surveillance Program because the State Secrets Doctrine prevents the plaintiffs
from discovering whether or not they were subjected to illegal wiretapping. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 493 F.3d at 655 ("[D]ue to the State Secrets Doctrine, the proof needed either to make
or negate such a showing is privileged, and therefore withheld from discovery or disclosure.");
id. at 692 (Gibbons, J., concurring) ("[T]he plaintiffs are ultimately prevented from establishing
standing because of the state secrets privilege.").
287 See supra notes 39-72 and accompanying text.
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it is protecting, but no such limitation is placed upon Congress when it acts pursuant
to its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.2a8 The ruling of the Supreme
Court in 0 Centro-upholding RFRA as applied to the federal government-is
proof of this proposition.289
Not only is Congress exercising a "core function" when it prohibits warrantless
eavesdropping in the United States, but the President's argument that eavesdropping
in the United States is intimately related to his war powers is also open to question.29
Is domestically-collected intelligence really more closely connected to the war effort
than steel production? The National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation are civilian, not military, agencies, and these agencies are, without any
doubt, subject to the control of Congress. It is not at all clear that the President is
acting as a military leader when he directs the conduct of those agencies. In addition,
even if electronic eavesdropping in the United States is considered to be military
activity, the President does not have a monopoly on the "war powers." 29' Congress
is entrusted by the Constitution with vast powers over the military as well, including
the express power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces." '292
In summary, Congress adopted FISA to protect the privacy of Americans and
lawful resident aliens in the United States. This is a core function of Congress.
288 See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 114-55 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 235-76 and accompanying text.
291 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Justice Jackson stated:
There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that
the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him
also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants.
He has no monopoly of "war powers," whatever they are. While Congress
cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy,
only Congress can provide him an army or navy to command. It is also
empowered to make rules for the "Government and Regulation of land
and naval Forces," by which it may to some unknown extent impinge
upon even command functions.
Id.
292 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Justice Jackson stated:
Assuming that we are in a war defacto, whether it is or is not a war
dejure, does that empower the Commander in Chief to seize industries
he thinks necessary to supply our army? The Constitution expressly
places in Congress power "to raise and support Armies" and "to provide
and maintain a Navy." This certainly lays upon Congress primary
responsibility for supplying the armed forces.
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Electronic surveillance in the United States is no more central to the powers of the
President than it is to the powers of Congress.
C. Justice Anthony Kennedy's Theory that the Purpose of the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers Is to Protect Liberty
Justice Anthony Kennedy has suggested that the ultimate purpose of the doctrine
of separation of powers is to preserve and enhance individual liberty. He advanced
and defended this idea in his concurring opinion in Clinton v. City of New York, where
the Court struck down the federal Line Item Veto Act on the ground that it violated
the doctrine of separation of powers.293
The majority in Clinton ruled that the Line Item Veto Act violated the Consti-
tution because it granted the President a role in making laws that the text of the
Constitution did not allow and that the Framers would not have permitted.294 Justice
Breyer dissented and would have upheld the Line Item Veto Act because its provisions
did not "threaten the liberties of individual citizens. 295 Justice Kennedy wrote sepa-
rately,"to respond to my colleague Justice Breyer, who observes that the statute does
not threaten the liberties of individual citizens, a point on which I disagree. '296 The
dispute over the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act was not simply a question
regarding the division of power between the executive and legislative branches, argued
Justice Kennedy, but rather one of whether "liberty is... at risk., 297 He said:
Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek
to transgress the separation of powers.
293 524 U.S. 417,448 (1998) ("[Our decision rests on the narrow ground that the procedures
authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the Constitution.").
294 See id. at 447-48. Justice Stevens stated:
[T]he only issue we address concerns the "finely wrought" procedure
commanded by the Constitution.... Thus, because we conclude that the
Act's cancellation provisions violate Article I, § 7, of the Constitution,
we find it unnecessary to consider the District Court's alternative holding
that the Act "impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the
three branches of government."
Id. (citation omitted).
293 Id. at 497 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297 Id. at 449-50. Justice Kennedy stated:
To say the political branches have a somewhat free hand to reallocate
their own authority would seem to require acceptance of two premises:
first, that the public good demands it, and second, that liberty is not at
risk. The former premise is inadmissible. The Constitution's structure
requires a stability which transcends the convenience of the moment.
The latter premise, too, is flawed.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Separation of powers was designed to implement a funda-
mental insight: Concentration of power in the hands of a single
branch is a threat to liberty. The Federalist states the axiom in
these explicit terms: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands ... may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." So convinced were
the Framers that liberty of the person inheres in structure that at
first they did not consider a Bill of Rights necessary. It was at
Madison's insistence that the First Congress enacted the Bill of
Rights. It would be a grave mistake, however, to think a Bill of
Rights in Madison's scheme then or in sound constitutional theory
now renders separation of powers of lesser importance.29
For Justice Kennedy, the reason that the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional
was that it placed too much power in the hands of the President. He stated, "By in-
creasing the power of the President beyond what the Framers envisioned, the statute
compromises the political liberty of our citizens, liberty which the separation of powers
seeks to secure." 2 9
How much more is liberty at stake in the conflict over the legality of the Terrorist
Surveillance Program? Unlike Clinton v. City of New York, we deal not with congres-
sional authorization of action by the executive branch, but rather with congressional
prohibition of action by the executive branch. Even more importantly, unlike Clinton
v. City of New York, we deal not with the public enactment or annulment of appro-
priations of public funds, but rather with the secret invasion of the privacy of every
citizen or lawful resident of the United States.
For Justice Robert Jackson, the essential meaning of the doctrine of separation
of powers is that our government must submit to the rule of law.300 For Justice
Anthony Kennedy, the central purpose of the doctrine of separation of powers is to
promote individual liberty.30' In this case, both principles are served by declaring
FISA to be constitutional.
CONCLUSION
The principal point of this Article is that Congress has plenary authority to
enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal government. Although this precept is
a fundamental one, neither the Supreme Court nor legal scholars have articulated this
point in clear, simple, and direct terms. Accordingly, I thought it necessary and appro-
298 Id. at 450 (citations omitted).
299 Id. at 452.
300 See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
3'0 See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
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priate to do so. The Supreme Court does not have a monopoly on the Bill of Rights.
Congress, too, has constitutional authority to interpret our rights and to enforce or
enlarge them as against the actions of the federal government.
I have written this Article because I believe that our nation is fast approaching
a constitutional crisis-yet another crisis over the responsibility of the President to
obey the law. And this crisis differs from those under previous administrations in that
the lawbreaking that has occurred is not simply that of a few individuals acting out of
selfish or political interests, but rather involves thousands or tens of thousands of loyal
Americans who believed that they were carrying out the lawful orders of the elected
leader of their country. Officials and employees of the National Security Agency as
well as other agencies have engaged in official acts of lawbreaking, encouraged by
a Department of Justice that has issued memoranda arguing that what was clearly
unlawful was instead lawful and justified.30 2
In the case of the matter addressed by this Article, Americans were unlawfully
spied upon by members of the National Security Agency. The criminal and civil lia-
bility of the people who ordered, approved, and carried out this illegal program of
electronic eavesdropping has yet to be determined, but it is potentially devastating,
both to the individuals involved and to the national interest. The same is true of other
persons and agencies who may have kidnapped, detained, and tortured persons in
violation of American statutes and treaty obligations. 33
Lincoln warned in his first significant public address that the danger to America
comes not from without-we can never be successfully invaded or conquered by a
foreign army-but from within, and he identified the danger as disobedience to the
rule of law. 304 Thurgood Marshall, in his oral argument to the Supreme Court in
Cooper v. Aaron, °5 the Little Rock desegregation case, made the same point, telling
the Court that he was not worried about the black children in Little Rock, but rather it
was the white children he was concerned for "who are told, as young people, that the
way to get your rights is to violate the law. ' '3° He said that he did not know "of any
302 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
303 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (Supp. 12001) (prohibiting torture); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441
(West Supp. 2007) (prohibiting war crimes); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOc. No. 100-20,
1465 U.N.T.S. 113; Mark Landler, CIA Agents'Arrest Sought by Germany, INT'LHERALD
TRIB., Feb. 1, 2007, at 1; Tracy Wilkinson & Maria de Cristofaro, Italy Indicts CIA Agents in
Kidnapping, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at 1.
... See Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois
(Jan. 27, 1838), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINcOLN 108, 109 (Roy P. Basler
ed., 1953).
305 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
306 MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955, at 254 (1993) (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993)
(quoting Attorney Thurgood Marshall in Cooper v. Aaron).
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more horrible destruction of [the] principle of citizenship" than this. 30 7 In Lincoln's
time, as well as Marshall's, it was "mob rule" that threatened our continued existence
as a nation. Today, it is official lawbreaking.
The Framers cloaked the President with "the executive power," and the President
is called the "Chief Executive" of our nation for a reason. That which the President
"executes" is the law. The Constitution does not give the President the power to
violate the law. Instead, the Constitution imposes upon the President the solemn duty
to uphold the law, to "faithfully execute the law."3 8
International terrorism is a significant threat to individuals who may fall victim
to these senseless acts of violence, but America, as a nation, faces little danger from
these fanatics. Compared to us, with our military and industrial strength, our eco-
nomic productivity, our intellectual and technological output, our legal and political
institutions, and our cultural influence, the terrorist organizations are insignificant.
While certainly dangerous and deadly, they pose no serious threat to our continued
existence as a free and independent nation.
But I fear for our nation if it becomes accepted doctrine that officials of the
American government are free to violate the law-that persons can be spied upon,
detained, or tortured-and that Congress and the courts can do nothing about it.309
The surest protection for our nation is a Congress that is willing to exercise its
power to enforce the Bill of Rights-to write law that binds the executive branch and
that is enforceable in the courts.
By enacting FISA, Congress exercised its constitutional authority to preserve and
protect the liberty of every American. The doctrine of separation of powers must not
be employed to allow the executive branch to invade that liberty and to invalidate
legislation that is intended to enforce the Bill of Rights. Instead, the doctrine of
separation of powers stands for the principle that the President must obey the law even
during time of war. FISA is constitutional, and the Terrorist Surveillance Program
is illegal.
307 Id.
308 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
" See Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145,
1167 (2006) ("[E]ven in the gravest national circumstances, the Constitution does not pre-
authorize the President, his subordinates, or anyone else, to torture someone in U.S. custody
using either a rationale of self-defense or a defense of necessity. In short, as lawyers and
citizens, we should resist the claim that a War on Terror permits the commander in chief's
power to be expanded into a wanton power to act as torturer in chief.").
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